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Should Marginally Deter
Charles N. W. Keckler

Abstract

Econometric measures of the effect of capital punishment have increasingly provided evidence that it deters homicides. However, most researchers on both sides
of the death penalty debate continue to rely on rather simple assumptions about
criminal behavior. I attempt to provide a more nuanced and predictive rational
choice model of the incentives and disincentives to kill, with the aim of assessing
to what extent the statistical findings of deterrence are in line with theoretical expectations. In particular, I examine whether it is plausible to suppose there is a
marginal increase in deterrence created by increasing the penalty from life imprisonment without parole to capital punishment. The marginal deterrence effect is
shown to be a direct negative function of prison conditions as they are anticipated
by the potential offender – the more tolerable someone perceives imprisonment
to be, the less deterrent effect prison will have, and the greater the amount of
marginal deterrence the threat of capital punishment will add. I then examine the
empirical basis for believing there to be a subset of killers who are relatively unafraid of the prison environment, and who therefore may be deterred effectively
only by the death penalty. Criminals, empirically, appear to fear a capital sentence,
and are willing to sacrifice important procedural rights during plea bargaining to
avoid this risk. This has the additional effect of increasing the mean expected
term of years attached to a murder conviction, and may generate a secondary deterrent effect of capital punishment. At least for some offenders, the death penalty
should induce greater caution in their use of lethal violence, and the deterrent effect seen statistically is possibly derived from the change in the behavior of these
individuals. This identification of a particular group on whom the death penalty
has the greatest marginal effect naturally suggests reforms in sentencing (and plea
bargaining) which focus expensive capital prosecutions on those most resistant to
alternative criminal sanctions.
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Driven by a renewed application of econometric tools to homicide statistics, the
debate between death penalty “abolitionists” and “retentionists,” 1 has entered a new
phase of renewed vigor. As recently as 1996, symposia on the desirability of the death
penalty were hard-pressed to find anyone in the legal academy willing to advocate the
practice – or even to tolerate it as an exercise of legislative discretion. 2 To the chagrin of
abolitionist academicians, recent years have seen the development of a series of studies
which can, in comparison with the early work on the death penalty, draw on a much
larger sample of executions, and a much longer time span in which to observe their
effect, as it is now over thirty years since the restoration of the death penalty, and
numerous states have moved in and out of the practice, allowing for comparison and
inference of causation.
This work has shown a substantial effect in terms of lives saved by each
execution, although the coefficients of how many lives are saved range wildly, from
eighteen to approximately four, the latter estimate being outside the margin of error of the
1

Use of these terms is one of the few conventions of the death penalty debate used here. Even this
terminology, however convenient, is dubious, as it evokes on the one hand William Lloyd Garrison and The
Liberator, Underground Railroads and suchlike heroics, while sticking death penalty proponents with some
unpleasant Freudian connotations at the same time as it underdescribes their program, which includes
introducing the death penalty to where it does not exist as well as retaining it where it is already present.
Nevertheless, the logical alternatives such as “pro-life” seem to be semantically occupied, or, as to its
opposite, “pro-death,” giving no great improvement in neutral description.
2
Daniel D. Polsby, Recontextualizing the Context of the Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 527, 527 (1996).
Some commentators have even characterized such conferences as performing an essentially ritual rather
than rational function, with the death penalty proponent as a stereotyped monster figure to be overcome by
the forces of good. See Ronald J. Allen and Amy Shavell, Further Reflections on the Guillotine, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 625, 626 (“Conferences on the death penalty in American law schools typically
are self-righteous displays of commitment to revealed truth, the truth being that opposition to the death
penalty goes without saying and the only issue is how strongly its proponents can be tarnished with either
their illogic or moral depravity. Indeed, the opposition (i.e., the proponents of the death penalty) are
typically represented, if at all, by someone who is supposed to utter barely comprehensible rantings about
victims and deterrence, but the real point of the display is to demonstrate the horrifying moral shortcomings
of one who wishes deliberately to take another’s life.”)
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former. 3 These results have led Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule to conclude that
capital punishment is not only allowable, but in fact “morally required,” because “[s]tates
that choose life imprisonment, when they might choose capital punishment, are ensuring
the deaths of a large number of innocent people.” 4 Given the assumption of deterrence,
this moral precept is hardly remarkable, yet it is notable that the first of these authors
characterizes himself as “skeptical of capital punishment for moral reasons” 5 while the
second had recently declared that the empirical debate over deterrence would be
unresolved for the “foreseeable future,” a conclusion the authors now think “wrong” –
implying the debate has been resolved or may be soon. 6
Because of the large number of variables that may affect the homicide rate, and
the relatively small samples of most studies (whose data points are usually states in
different years), it is unsurprising there have been difficulties in statistical inference. 7 In

3

Hashem Dezhbakhsh, Paul H. Rubin, & Joanna M. Shepherd, Does Capital Punishment Have a Deterrent
Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 344, 369 (2003)
(providing estimate of 18, plus or minus 10); H. Naci Mocan & R. Kaj Gittings, Getting off Death Row:
Commuted Sentences and the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 46 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (2003)
(coefficient of 5); Joannna M. Shepherd, Murders of Passion, Execution Delays, and the Deterrence of
Capital Punishment, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 309 (2004) (coefficient of 4.5). See also Lawrence Katz,
Steven D. Levitt, & Ellen Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, 5 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 318, 336, n.9 (2003) (although not considering the estimate to be reliable, calculating a
coefficient for the the latest period they study, years 1970-1990, that translates into 10.04 lives saved per
execution).
4
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of
Life-Life Tradeoffs, U. Chicago Law & Econ, Olin Working Paper No. 239 (March 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=691447.
5
Id. at 3.
6
Id. at n.16
7
See generally, Samuel Cameron, A Review of the Econometric Evidence on the Effects of Capital
Punishment, 23 JOURNAL OF SOCIO-ECONOMICS 197 (1994). See also Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich, supra
note 3, at 319 (“Even if a substantial deterrent effect does exist, the amount of crime rate variation induced
by executions may simply be too small to be detected. Assuming a reduction of seven homicides per
execution (a number consistent with Ehrlich, 1975), observed levels of capital punishment in Texas since
1976 (a total of 144 executions through 1997) would have reduced the annual number of homicides in
Texas by about fifty, or 2% of the overall rate. Given that the standard deviation in the annual number of
homicides in Texas over this same time period is over 200, it is clearly a difficult challenge to extract the
execution-related signal from the noise in homicide rates.”) (citing to the classic work by Isaac Ehrlich, The
Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975)). I
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order to “know” there is “no deterrence” we need to have empirical evidence that the
appropriate coefficient relating an execution to a change in the rate of homicide is
centered on zero, plus or minus some relatively small level of error, and this requires a
substantial amount of data. Moreover, the coefficient should be valid among that small
group of very bad men for whom it is relevant, and it is rare that research is focused on
these people. There is a great difference too often elided between concluding one
currently lacks the ability to distinguish a coefficient from zero, and concluding that the
coefficient is zero. One important distinction is that although zero may be within the
range of error of an estimate, if the mean of the estimate indicates deterrence (a negative
effect on murder rates), then if there is any effect whatsoever, it is more likely to be a
deterrent one, and policymakers take a risk by assuming the absence of an effect.
My impression of the literature is that much of it proceeds by assuming that the
absence of proof has proved absence, which is mistaken not only as a matter of logic, but
also highly problematic as a matter of policy. If there is no effect of the death penalty on
deterrence, it could be because there are countervailing forces that prevent it from
reducing, on net, the behavior it sanctions. The causal relationship will not, however,
resemble the relationship the murder rate has with the position of the planet Mars, bringer
of war. With apologies to astrology, we would not be surprised to find Mars has “no
effect” on murder; by contrast, it goes against expectations to find that the state’s threat
of death, directed against specified acts by citizens, has “no effect” on the frequency of
such acts. Without more information, we do not know whether this threat would have a

note only that there would be some value in extracting this signal, since if true, twenty years of executions
would have saved the lives of a thousand people in Texas alone.
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very small effect, or the perverse effect of increasing rates, yet it is odd to assume it
would possess no connection at all.
I am less confident of the empirical data than are Sunstein and Vermeule, because
the same preconditions hold for proof of deterrence as hold for proof of nondeterrence,
the difference being that the advocate of deterrence would be attempting to confirm a
coefficient centered on a number greater than zero.

The current variability in the

empirical estimates of deterrence should, in my view, appropriately make one pause
before accepting as more than preliminary those studies on which Sunstein and Vermeule
base their “must kill” mandate. But even without full confidence in nonzero deterrence,
the empirical work should certainly make us profoundly question any supposed proof we
have for zero deterrence effects, an assumption on which too much of the literature
depends. The serious possibility of deterrence must be acknowledged, and standing
alone, this has important normative consequences implicitly incorporated below.
The econometric work is also inconclusive for another reason: the lack of a
behavioral basis for why the effects detected are in fact predictable and understandable
from the basis of a theoretical model. Although it is commonsensical to posit fear of
death as a behavioral motivator, it is not often made explicit why criminals should be
expected to behave as the models infer, and why they should do so at some particular
rate. That this is asking a lot of data analysts is an appropriate rejoinder, but in the
absence of a behavioral model one is able to test, as opposed to results one is able only to
interpret, I think it is likely the intellectual stalemate over death penalty deterrence will
likely continue. 8

This is not to say that deterrence lacks a theoretical foundation; the

8

See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413, 436 (1999) (“No issue of
criminal justice has been subjected to greater empirical study than whether the death penalty is an effective
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burden of what follows is to put together the pieces of such a foundation long been
present in the literature, stating them explicitly and coherently at a time when the legal
academy has once again been compelled to take seriously, at minimum, the factual
possibility of deterrence.
As a cautionary note, inconclusiveness does not imply a refusal to enforce capital
punishment. The executive, the legislators and the citizenry are unable to enjoy the subtle
pleasures of intellectual ambivalence. To not execute criminals is to make a choice
regarding the effect of the death penalty, just as to execute them reflects such a choice, 9
and there seems to be no way around the fact that the state will do one or the other. It is
fair to say that this choice is made today in doubt, but as all must recognize, the standard
of proof for making policy is not beyond even reasonable doubt. It is not even “clear and
convincing.” Aside from the legal meanings, these are the qualitative expressions of
standards that are appropriate in scholarship before a phenomenon is asserted to be an
established fact. Action, however, must be taken even where these standards are not met,
and guided by the best collective guesses regarding the weight of evidence and theory;
this means inevitably that one must on occasion proceed even though one is not
“convinced” and the matter is not “clear.”

deterrent, and on none is the evidence more ambiguous and conflicting.”) It is interesting to compare this
judgment – made prior to the latest round of studies favorable to deterrence – with the far less agnostic
views of Professor Lempert: “Supporters of the death penalty, for example, cannot be faulted for resorting
to retributive arguments for capital punishment when empirical evidence consistently fails to find a
substantial deterrent effect, but they are wrong to suggest that deterrence is an important reason for the
death penalty, given the overwhelmingly negative findings of numerous empirical studies.” Richard O.
Lempert, Activist Scholarship, LAW & SOC. REV. (2001) (praising the findings of no deterrence as one of
the greatest practical and scholarly achievements of the law and society movement).
9
Allen & Shavell, supra note 2 at 628, arguing that the death penalty debate should be reframed as a
problem of social planning (“In a universe with finite resources, allocation decisions with real
consequences must constantly be made, and one of the primary consequences invariably is who will live
and who will die, if not tomorrow, then sometime in the future.”)
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Assuming a murky empirical picture is indeed what we have to guide us, my
purpose is to proceed from the general premises of rational choice theory, together with
some basic demographic methods, to explore what we should expect to see from
empirical evidence, as well as where we should look for such evidence. It would be
absurd to think that a few lines of algebra could convince either way those who are at
loggerheads over what is shown by the longitudinal data on homicide; the only hope is
the present effort might serve to sharpen this debate by developing assumptions held in
common or exposing those hidden differences regarding behavioral expectation that may
contribute to the disputes over interpretation.
The stakes of this debate may or may not be high – that depends on which side of
the question one takes. 10 The abolitionist position of no effect means that although there
is an incremental effect on the punishment meted out to several dozen convicted
murderers every year, who are not allowed to live out their span of years within the
confines of the penitentiary, the public at large is neither helped nor hurt by the presence
of the death penalty. On the other hand, to the retentionist asserting a deterrent effect,
these matters should be of considerable importance. The ending of the not-very happy
existence of the murderer, according to this hypothesis, redounds on the populace by
saving some number of citizens who would otherwise be killed, perhaps, according to the
10

The point refers only to the question of deterrence, and what follows takes a “consequentialist” view of
the social desirability of the death penalty; I acknowledge the cultural observation that many people seem
to be attached or opposed to the death penalty for so-called “moral” reasons, some of them related to what
the criminal law literature is pleased to call “desert.” To be specific, they claim any coefficient relating
number of executions to number of murders would be irrelevant to the desirability of the death penalty as a
matter of public policy. The presence of such views is interesting from an anthropological perspective, but
accounting for them is beyond the scope of the present study. If it were shown that indeed the proper
measure of deterrent effect of capital punishment was near zero (or negative), it would then seem
appropriate to introduce secondary considerations of the public weal such as feelings of vindication or
anxiety, international opprobrium, and the like. Possibly the death penalty would then not be worth the
social expenditures made upon it, although given that the number of innocent lives at stake would be very
small (involving only those wrongfully convicted and executed, itself a quantity that studies have failed to
distinguish from zero), the interest in the policy decision would necessarily be diminished.

6
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

coefficients of the models noted above and multiplied over the number of executions,
several hundred citizens. The death penalty is often noted for being a particularly
emotional issue, involving strongly held and asserted beliefs, yet it is surprising how mild
the reaction actually is to public behavior that, if one held to even the possibility of
substantial deterrence, might amount to lethal activity on a scale far exceeding that which
would usually be of concern (with regard to unknown hazards of pollutant release, say).
As an example, the then-governor of Illinois, George Ryan, shortly before leaving
office in January 2003, commuted the sentences of all 156 murderers on Illinois to death
row. This expanded the moratorium on executions Ryan had put into effect three years
earlier in January of 2000. Governor Ryan was sufficiently praised by the abolitionist
community so as to be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. 11 The community in favor
of the death penalty reacted with a certain amount of grumbling, and there were legal
challenges to the propriety of this action, but these were largely focused on the process by
which the commutation had occurred, rather than any substantive effect of Ryan’s
magnanimous gesture upon the public welfare. 12 Nonetheless, the result of a statistical
inquiry into death penalty practice with regard to commuting sentences and releasing
condemned prisoners, using data up to 1997, indicates that “an additional execution
generates a reduction in homicide by five, an additional commutation increases
11

See Kevin McDermott, He’s Nobel Finalist, Sources Say, THE ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, October 5,
2003 (“‘Out of 6 billion people in the world, it’s down to (an estimated) five people. (Ryan’s) in there with
the pope,’” said Francis Boyle, the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana law professor who has
spearheaded the Ryan-Nobel drive.”) This acclaim preceded Ryan’s felony indictment by a federal grand
jury for being the head of a wide-ranging criminal conspiracy; this might have complicated international
travel to pick up his prize. See Steve Warmbir & Tim Novak, ‘The State of Illinois Was For Sale’; Ryan
could face 7 to 9 years in prison if convicted of racketeering, fraud, lying to FBI, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2003.
12

See People ex. rel. Madigan v. Snyder, 208 Ill.2d 457, 479 (finding Governor’s action “unreviewable”
but expressing hope that the governors would use this power in the future in “individual cases”) (emphasis
added).
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homicides by four to five, and an additional removal brings about one additional
murder.” 13 The same data failed to show any effect of executions or lack thereof on the
rates of other violent crime (robberies, burglaries, rapes, or motor vehicle thefts),
indicating “capital punishment is a murder-specific deterrent.” 14
It is interesting to apply this model to the natural experiment provided us by
Governor Ryan, whose declarations of moratorium and then clemency were responding
in part to a widely publicized anti-death penalty campaign led by significant segments of
the legal community and the largest Illinois newspaper, the Chicago Tribune (rewarded
with the Pulitzer Prize for its success). This publicity is relevant to the extent that one
requires information about a change in law (this one being made through the exercise of
purely executive authority) to be disseminated in order to induce a change in behavior.
To study how criminals might have responded – in a purely illustrative spirit – I
compared the violent crime statistics provided by the FBI for Illinois over the period
1999-2003 (the five years for which they are readily available online). These list both the
total numbers and rate of all violent crimes, and the total and rate of homicide. 15

Table 1. Illinois Crime Rates 1997-2003

2003
2002
2001
2000
1999

Violent
Crimes
70456
78214
79504
81567
88838

Rate
per Homicides
100,000
556.8
896
620.7
949
636.9
986
656.8
891
732.5
937

Rate
per % Violence
100,000
that is Lethal
7.1
1.28
7.5
1.21
7.9
1.24
7.2
1.10
7.7
1.05

13

For a review of this evidence, see Mocan & Gittings, Getting off Death Row, supra note 3, at 465-466.
See id. at 473.
15
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES reports, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius.
14
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The most apparent feature from Table 1 is that although violent crime has been
declining both in absolute and population terms, the number of murders has remained
relatively steady, at least in absolute numbers. Consequently, after year 2000 murder has
become a more important component of the overall victimization. Whatever has been
driving down the rate of violence in Illinois is having less of an effect (if any) on the rate
of homicide. Naturally, there are many possible hypotheses for this; perhaps the murder
rate is already so low little can be done about it, or perhaps the factors reducing violent
crime are specific to them and not to killing. Nevertheless, it is certainly consistent with
the view that some form of countervailing factor specifically increasing the homicide
rate is present in the most recent observations.
Presuming for the moment the presence of this factor, we can calculate its
practical consequences. If homicides had fallen at the same rate as other violent crime in
the latest three years, the percent of homicides would have remained at, taking the higher
of the first two observations, 1.1% of such crimes. This would have resulted in a
predicted number of murders in 2003, 2002, and 2001, respectively, of 775, 860, and 875.
This is 121, 89, and 111 less than what is actually observed, or in aggregate, 321 more
people turn up dead than we might have thought. This is a very rough estimate, but it is
in line with, although possibly more hopeful than, the statistical prediction that 624 (4 X
156) people would be killed by the commutation alone (although, on the other hand, the
long-term effects on the homicide rate may not yet have played themselves out).
A simple calculation, applied to a single case, can hardly be thought conclusive,
but it ought to at least – as part of a piece with the econometric evidence – be considered
more troubling by policymakers than is usually the case. It is admittedly difficult for

9
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econometrics to pick out an effect on behavior that is undeniably influenced by many
social phenomena, but this argument cuts both ways, because if one is unable to specify
the right model for a complex dependent variable, one cannot be certain that a particular
independent variable of interest does not exert some influence.
Whatever ill might be thought of Governor Ryan (or his erstwhile allies among
the bar, the press, and the academy), it would be unrealistic and cruel to suppose that he
in any way intended 300-600 innocent people to die as a consequence of his policy.
Indeed, because the anti-death penalty campaign was frequently couched in terms of a
concern to eliminate the mere possibility that innocent lives (by wrongful conviction) be
lost, and there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of this concern, the people involved
must have at a fundamental level assumed that the deterrence argument was not simply
unproven, but implausible, perhaps impossible. Otherwise it is very difficult to rationally
account for their actions – for if they were in doubt about the criminological
consequences of commutation, a blanket commutation would have been recognized as
extremely reckless, rather than being touted as an essentially costless act of mercy.
It is at this point, and on this point, that greater attention could be paid to
examining whether it is at least plausible to believe that at least some substantial portion
of potential murderers take seriously the difference between life in prison and death. In
Part I, as a necessary preliminary, the model of marginal deterrence is made specifically
applicable to the special circumstances where the crime and its perceived benefits
involve killing another person, and the possible but not certain social response to the
crime involves ending the offender’s life. As discussed in Part II, there is good reason to
believe that when the death penalty is a jurisdiction’s maximum penalty for first-degree
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murder, the presence of this sanction ought to marginally deter some potential murderers
from committing at least some of the murders they would otherwise be prone to commit
in a jurisdiction where the maximum criminal liability is life in prison without parole.
In particular, the most fundamental assumption of the deterrence model, that
death is perceived by murderers to be worse than life in prison, appears to hold for the
great majority of murderers, although a small but identifiable fraction is either basically
indifferent or actually prefers death. In addition, there is inferential but strong evidence
that there is wide variation among in the utility cost per unit time incarcerated.
Consequently, certain offenders will experience, and can anticipate, a relatively lighter
deterrent effect from threat of prison, and these will disproportionately consist of violent
felons incarcerated for long periods, and thus contain some murderers. Finally, for all
those charged with murder, but especially for those for whom death represents a
substantially worse outcome than long-term imprisonment, avoiding any risk of a death
sentence will cause them to accept longer terms of imprisonment in lieu of trial, raising
the expected mean prison term, and incorporating in the effect of the death penalty any
marginal effect on crime of longer sentences. Part III briefly considers a few of the
implications of the foregoing conclusions for research and policy.

I. The Utility of Victims
Justice Holmes is credited with articulating the “bad man” theory of the law. 16 To
put it in its essential form, Holmes proposed the law exists because there are bad people
who are selfish, and who will do bad (i.e., socially harmful) things for their personal gain,

16

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897) (“If you want to know
the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct,
whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”)
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unless and insofar as society punishes those bad things with imposed costs in excess of
their potential for gain. This view has often been quibbled with, because it is an
incomplete theory of the various functions and purposes of the law, and also because the
populace is sufficiently self-regarding, often unconsciously, that most of us must qualify
as “bad men” who at times require guidance and incentive to keep in accord with social
norms. Holmes no doubt intended at least this latter inference, for his view of mankind
was not a rosy one, and he used the nature of the law as evidence of human
incorrigibility. 17

Regardless of this point, one need not accept wholeheartedly the

Holmesian vision to acknowledge in a more limited fashion that certain species of law
seem to be peculiarly directed at individuals whose preferences are both unusual as a
statistical matter, and if these persons were given full opportunity to express these
preferences, much of the rest of the population would consider itself worse off. 18 Hence
the incentive on the part of the majority to put in place mechanisms that will stymie the
expression of those harmful desires of the minority. For want of a better word, I will refer
to this frustrated subset of the greater population as “bad.”
Due to the grave difficulty many people – even many sophisticated people – have
in understanding the apparently extremely complex and mysterious term “bad,” I will
offer an example. In February 1992, the State of Wisconsin sentenced Mr. Jeffrey
Dahmer to fifteen consecutive life sentences (although he only lasted two years in prison
before being killed by a fellow convict). It might be objected, probably correctly, that

17

See J. W. Burrow, Holmes in His Intellectual Milieu, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
17, 25 (Robert W. Gordon ed., 1992) (explaining the origins of Holmes's Darwinian attitudes).
18
Cf. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy,
1990 DUKE LAW JOURNAL 1, 15-16 (1990) (characterizing criminals as those whose preferences impose
externalities on others).
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Jeffrey Dahmer is not quite what Justice Holmes had in mind by the “bad man.” No
doubt Dahmer represents an extreme case, chosen specifically to illustrate an extension of
Holmes’s reasoning applicable to the law of capital murder. For if the law in general is
directed at the behavior of the bad man, the law of capital murder is directed is at the very
bad man, 19 and the very bad man – unlike Holmes’s bad man, perhaps – differs from you
or I in important ways.
Prior to his detention, Mr. Dahmer had been busy since the late 1970’s gratifying
needs for a peculiar sort of companionship, resulting in, among other activities, attempts
to transform acquaintances into docile helpmates by “drilling holes in his living victims’
heads, [and] pouring in chemicals to ‘zombify’ them.” 20 Dahmer’s involuntary patients
died, however, because he could never perfect his psychosurgery technique. One should
observe – as the Wisconsin jury in this matter certainly did – that the social norms of
Milwaukee appear to have compelled Mr. Dahmer to pursue his activities surreptitiously,
hampering them by, for instance, requiring him to reject potential subjects who had
automobiles, as abandonment of these would create problematic inquiries upon the
zombification and disappearance of their drivers. 21 He was also forced to expend extra
labor in concealment, for instance, pulverizing bones or dissolving them with acid.
Dahmer correctly perceived that the authorities would prevent his activities, as indeed
they did after 13 years and 17 victims. Obviously, the legal regime and its associated

19

Since the population subset of interest is in fact almost exclusively male – itself a highly relevant fact,
although it seems to be only uncomfortably accommodated in the criminal law literature – I feel absolutely
no compunction about maintaining the nineteenth-century flavor of this phrase. See MARTIN DALY AND
MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 178 (1988) (reporting that for homicides occurring in connection with a crime
– which are the ones usually eligible for capital murder – more than 97% of perpetrators were male).
20
Anne C. Gresham, The Insanity Plea: A Futile Defense for Serial Killers, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV.
193, 200 (1993).
21
See Gresham, id. at 205 (the calculated manner by victims were selected and evidence concealed was
emphasized during trial, in the successful effort to defeat Dahmer’s insanity plea).
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threat of incapacitation and punishment failed to fully deter Dahmer, because in certain
circumstances over those years (opportunities partly contrived by him) his expected gains
were still larger than his expected costs, yet the law did alter the rate of his crimes by
increasing the labor and time investment necessary to reduce the chance of capture, 22 and
thus the expected cost, to a point at which it became rational for him to violate the legal
rules against killing and eating people. On most days, Dahmer could not, for fear of the
authorities, act as he otherwise would have, a phenomenon we usually call deterrence.
Dahmer, a very bad man, was deterred, and in consequence, lives were saved.
To abstract a bit, Dahmer had certain tastes in his set of preferences that created
negative externalities for his victims and society at large; the satisfaction of these
preferences is banned by the law of murder and is of no account in most versions of
social utility, although by hypothesis, it determines a major component of Dahmer’s
personal utility, which he pursued to some extent rationally. Although not as lurid in
their desires, other criminals can likewise be characterized as possessed of socially inutile
preferences, such as wishing for a monopoly on the affections of their inamorata despite
the presence of a sexual rival, or desiring the use of an expensive automobile without the
inconvenience of paying for it. As such, there is nothing “irrational” or socially harmful
about possessing preferences for love and luxury. The problem with criminals, for the
most part, even murderers with whom we are most concerned, is simply that their desires

22

This is a direct implication of Becker’s original economic model of crime, the primary progenitor of most
subsequent models (including, of course, this one). See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a blessedly concise treatment of the economic
theory of criminal deterrence, see Steven Shavell Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary
Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1234-35 (1985); for a more extended and recent review
of Shavell’s thinking, see STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 471-568
(2004)
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are not determined by their budget, and they therefore resort to force and fraud in order to
obtain them more cheaply.
Only rarely is capital murder is done for its own sake, à là Leopold and Loeb;
there is generally an instrumental purpose to violence, and if sufficient resources were at
hand, and one was not miserly about spending them, most desires can be achieved. Even
as to criminals who desire goods and services for which there exists no legal market, i.e.
cocaine or sex with minors, this does not imply violence, for if the criminal is willing and
able to invest time and money, such goals can often be achieved without physical force.
Most criminals are not millionaires, however, in part because most people are not
millionaires, but also because the criminal mindset is not conducive to gaining or
retaining large amounts of wealth, and even more so because millionaires have ways of
getting what they want through voluntary exchange, even if they want rather a lot.
Consider a potential killer who thinks a female relative has “dishonored” the
family, and in order to remove the stain on himself and the rest of the woman’s family –
gain a perceived benefit – the woman must be killed; this is a short description of the
phenomenon of so-called honor killing, a problem in several areas of the world.23 Of
course, the woman’s offense could come in several gradations of the violation of the local
code of sexual morality; she could shame the family more or less, and thus the “benefit”
of removing this shame would be more or less. Therefore an honor killing, although it is
bound up with a variety of what we could call unreasonable emotions, is likely to respond
to rational incentives; if we increase the sanction for taking a woman’s life, a violent
male relative will probably find it within himself to tolerate certain low-grade “lapses” in
23

See Kathryn Christine Arnold, Are the Perpetrators of Honor Killings Getting Away With Murder?
Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code Analyzed Under the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1343, 1358-1359 (2001).
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behavior or at least require stronger proof of “immorality” before acting. And indeed the
global effort to rein in honor killings focuses on the excessive tolerance some countries
show for such murders, and betrays a deterrence rationale along with its obvious point
about upholding a woman’s right to life and personal autonomy. 24 It is generally thought
the low penalties attached to “honor killings” produce more of them than would
otherwise occur, and indeed permit murders not truly motivated by family honor but
which can be disguised as such. 25 Most of these murderers – unlike Dahmer —have only
one person they are prone to kill, but they too can be deterred, because whether or not
they think a woman “ought” (in their system of belief) to be killed, they will not want to
bear the cost of doing so.
The usual conception of deterrence in the literature, that our goal is to raise the
cost of the forbidden act beyond the value set upon it by the potential actor, can therefore
be slightly misleading. The value of the act varies between individuals, and even as to
individuals, its net value (taking into account, for instance, the possibility of resistance by
the victim) varies between occasions. It is simply not feasible to deter the most extreme
individuals, when they are their most desperate, by means of a generally applicable
penalty, and it can be inefficient (as well as draconian) to do so. 26 What deterrence can
do is to reduce the number of individuals for whom a particular act is ever rational (the
24

See, e.g., Arnold, id. at 1373, complaining that “Jordanian law is particularly discriminatory to women
because of the lack of legal deterrent and the wide scope of males who will benefit from the it.” See also
Marie D. Castetter, Note, Taking Law Into Their Own Hands: Unofficial and Illegal Sanctions By The
Pakistani Tribal Councils, 13 Ind. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 543, 552 (2003) (reporting that with regard to
rural Pakistan: “The killings are on the rise because the murderers in honor killings are rarely punished.”)
25
See Arnold, supra note 23, at 1370 (honor killing is a pretext)
26
See Shavell, supra note 22 at 1242. Shavell’s model of designing penalties is based on judicial
uncertainty about what the correct penalty is for a particular person, knowing that those who commit a
crime, or who are tempted to commit one, vary in those characteristics relevant to the fixing of an optimal
penalty for them, and this creates a informational difficulty for society, which is obliged to attach to crimes
a generic penalty for everybody. In this way it clearly foreshadows the current analysis, wherein an attempt
is made to get greater about the level and distribution of the relevant variation.
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not so very bad men) and to reduce the number of times acts are rational for those very
bad persons who will have motives for crime that are not fully deterrable.

This

necessarily presumes a focus on the particular mentality of potential criminals as a
distinct class of the economic actors, together with the cost-benefit context in which they
make their decisions.
Introducing a certain level of formalism may be appropriate at this point, in order
to clarify how my view diverges from previous considerations of deterrence. The basic
deterrence model can be phrased as stating that D commits crime Q if and only if, as to
crime Q, it is profitable as defined by (1) below, where B is the benefit D derives from
successful commission of the crime, C is the intrinsic non-legal cost of the crime,
incorporating such risks as victim resistance and expenditures for equipment, 27 A is the
probability that a legal sanction will be imposed (melding here for simplicity chances of
arrest, prosecution and conviction) and P is the level of that sanction.
(1)

B-C > A*P

In a world without law, or as to activities not legally discouraged, A and P are set to 0,
and (1) reduces to a simple comparison of cost and benefit. In order to make subsequent
discussion more concrete, assume the act under consideration is the murder of another
human being, Q, and the law will take some concern with it, meaning A > 0, and P > 0.
If B is the benefit one derives from killing another person, it clearly must vary not
only with the defendant but with the victim. Dudley kills Quigley, to what gain? Even if
27

C is a variable that is not always separately considered. See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 22 at 1238. This is
a mistake, since important policy concerns depend on it, like those involving the desirability of an armed
population, and individual differences in this variable help account for why some people (e.g. elderly
unarmed ladies) are more likely to be found as victims rather than perpetrators. According to Holmes’s
speculation, C for some people would also include something called “the conscience” that imposes an
increment of subjective cost to the actor, over and above the cost to their material well-being, but Holmes is
not very interested in such hypothetical persons.
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Quigley couldn’t fight back and C is very low, and even if Dudley could “get away with
it” (A is very low), there has to be something Dudley gets out of the transaction. 28 This
cannot be emphasized enough. There are six billion people in this world, and they do not
kill each other nearly as often as they could, because harming another person can only
help a killer in peculiar circumstances. Whether or not the death penalty ought to deter
does not depend on how we, or “people,” or even other members of the animal kingdom
(whose actions, by and large, are governed by a notable aversion to mortality) set a value
on our respective lives vis-à-vis any value we might place on the socially unsanctioned
elimination of the lives of other people. Rather, it depends entirely on the behavioral
niceties of a small, distinct and identifiable group of males who will at one or more times
in their lives seriously contemplate murder as either a means to some end or as an end
itself. 29 Studies of this group show they have an average of four major felony arrests,

28

What we would all do if the cost of murder were to fall to near-zero we need not address. This is
emphatically not the case in pre-legal societies, since the potential vengeance by surviving relatives, as well
as victim resistance, usually keep the effective cost of murder well above zero. See MARTIN DALY AND
MARGO WILSON, HOMICIDE 224-227 (1988) (discussing among other groups, the Ifugao of the Philippines,
who have but “one general law… a life must be paid with a life”) (internal quotation marks omitted, italics
in original). In societies with tradable goods, homicide compensation in the form of a reciprocating
transfer of chattels or valuables to the victim’s heirs places a enumerated “cost” for the crime. See, e.g.,
MERVYN MEGGITT, BLOOD IS THEIR ARGUMENT 137-143 (1977) (describing negotiated compensation in
pigs paid in 57/76 homicides in Highland New Guinea group). This contrasts with the theoretical costs of
which we are speaking here, created by the probabilistic and heterogeneous collection of non-monetary
harms inflicted by the state in “advanced” societies. The only time costs for murder fall to near-zero for a
potential murderer is when there is not only an absence of state punishment for the crime, but also approval
by a state with monopoly of force, guaranteeing the perpetrator will act without consequences or resistance.
Hence, this cost structure is a feature of genocide, mass murder, massacres, death squads, lynching, and
related phenomena now all too familiar.
29
Sir James Stephen, the great nineteenth-century deterrence theorist and legal reformer, was among the
many who have no doubt anticipated what should be an obvious point: “Some men, probably, abstain from
murder because they fear that, if they committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands
abstain from it because they regard it with horror.” JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (1863). Stephen’s view is perhaps overly optimistic; the real restraint on
murder is lack of the usual police triumvirate of means, motive, and opportunity, and the most important of
these is lack of motive. Killing other people is not like killing flies – it is an inherently dangerous and risky
activity with which almost nobody has any experience. To murder someone without a very good reason to
do so is supremely irrational, and most of us simply lack the necessary very good reasons. Moreover,
because lethal violence has probably always been costly, including in human ancestral environments,
discussed supra, note 28, it is extremely unlikely that evolution would have produced a “killer instinct;”
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undoubtedly an underestimate since it fails to account for their usually lengthy juvenile
records. 30
Disregarding group enemies, a vanishingly small number of other individuals will
be known by most actors to satisfy the equation B-C > 0, given any particular pair of
persons d and q. Formally, for the set of people D1, D2, D3… Dsix billion, and potential
victims, Q1, Q2, Q3… Qsix billion, Cd,q > Bd,q is much more likely than Bd,q > Cd,q. The law
of murder is simply not concerned with that subset of D for whom C > B for all Q.
Rather, it must focus purely on the complementary subset, call it D*, for whom there
exists a pair (d,q) where Bd,q > Cd,q, where, in other words, a murder will occur in the
absence of some probability (A) of a meaningful sanction (P).
Although A certainly can be adjusted by legal rules, especially when it includes as
here issues of the likelihood of conviction of guilty parties, A is basically an issue of law
enforcement, and the main concern here is of course P, the level of the sanction.
Probability of arrest and conviction certainly matter, but since we are focusing on
murder, they are relatively high, 31 although they vary between occasions, as the case of
Dahmer illustrates. The reason Dahmer was deterred from pursuing victims with cars
instead, there should have been strong selective pressure for a mechanism that could at some level take
account of the benefits and risks of such a perilous behavior. See generally, Owen D. Jones, Time-Shifted
Rationality and the Law of Law’s Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology, 95 NW. U.
L. REV. 1141, 1173 (2001) (discussing reference to ancestral problems for the development of human
decision making apparatus)
30
Daniel D. Polsby and Don B. Kates, Jr., American Homicide Exceptionalism, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 969,
996 (1998) (noting that that any pretended similarity of murderers to the general population is an
“extravagant falsification of reality”).
31
The “clearance rate” for murder, or chance of an arrest, is in excess of 60%. See CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2003, 256, available from the FBI at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_03/pdf/03sec3.pdf (2004)
(reporting rate of 62.4%). Subsequent prosecution and conviction are lower, but never fall to such an
insignificant probability that a potential murderer would ignore the potential of suffering legal
repercussions. It does mean that individuals who would derive a benefit from killing that is a significant
percentage of their own expected lifetime utility cannot be deterred by the criminal justice system, because
as is discussed below, the most that can be achieved by either lifetime imprisonment or capital punishment
is the elimination of all future utility. Since this is discounted by A, the maximum expected penalty is
lower than this total loss. See Shavell, supra, note 22 at 1244 & n.45.
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was, at the simplest level, because a Q(with car) was associated with a high A, one that
resulted in (1) not being satisfied, whereas a Q(without car) sufficiently lowered A so that
(1) was satisfied. It would be dangerous to assume, though, that only the probability of
arrest and not its multiplier, P, mattered in these cases. If Dahmer had known that upon
capture, international law applied, and he would merely have been scolded to cease and
desist his killing and eating of others, at the risk of being sent a very stern letter
expressing the sincere displeasure of the authorities, the frequency of circumstances
where (1) is satisfied would have been higher. From his behavior we know that:
(2)

ACAR *P > B-C > ANO CAR * P

We do not know the level of A precisely, but assume that B, C, and P are the
same between the two situations, and that P is life in prison (because Wisconsin is a nondeath penalty state). Suppose ACAR is approximately equal to 60% (a normal clearance
rate for a murder) and ANO CAR is equal to 10% (a rate commensurate with the number of
people Dahmer killed). This would mean an incremental difference of .5 P provided
deterrence because B-C was somewhere between .6P and .1P.
Reducing the penalty therefore has a mathematically defined equivalency to
altering the arrest rate. What we can tell (given these assumptions) is that if we reduced
the penalty from life imprisonment to something lower, and the expected sanction fell
below a 10% chance of life imprisonment, then people with cars would have been at risk
from Dahmer. In this case, the equivalent reduction would be somewhere in between P
and P/6, whatever is 1/6th as bad as life in prison. There is no a priori function relating
this, mainly because individual criminals will vary in how quickly they discount future
losses, as well as in how they perceive the fixed cost of any arrest and imprisonment; P/6
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might mean 1 year’s imprisonment or 5 years. However, P/6 is almost certainly greater
than the perceived sanction of probation or a suspended sentence, because looked at from
the other side, it must be that the net benefits of killing are perceived of as a meaningful
fraction of lifetime utility, and it is most unlikely that lifetime utility is so affected by
noncustodial sanctions that an individual would forego what they perceive to be such
important benefits.
So, the level of the penalty matters, even if some people are not deterred, and
some people are deterred only some of the time. The question for deterrence theory is
not what will deter all crime but what the “optimal sanction” will be given the reduction
in crime balanced against the various costs associated with application of the sanction. In
Shavell’s formulation, “As the level of sanctions rises, more undesirable acts will be
deterred, but the social cost of imposing sanctions in a given instance becomes greater, as
does the problem of discouraging socially desirable acts. The optimal level of the
sanction will be that which makes the best compromise between these competing
effects.” 32 Applying this basic theory to murder adds considerable richness but also
certain complications to the model. The primary focus of this Article concerns how many
“more undesirable acts” (murders) will be deterred when the level of sanction rises
between life imprisonment and capital punishment, a reasonably concrete question. In
order to justify such a focus, we must first discuss why the social cost factors are not
determinative.

32

Shavell, supra note 22, at 1243-44.
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To begin with, the number of “socially desirable acts” we might confuse with
murder, most especially first-degree murder, is rather small. 33 This is not a problem of
mistaken identity – that is a separate issue, but of a circumstance when the actor did
indeed do the act, but the act is not actually a murder, although it so appears. There are
certainly circumstances such as euthanasia or abortion where somebody can end up dead
at the hands of someone else. Likewise, any risky activity like firefighting or surgery
brings with it the risk of death by misadventure and potential liability for someone who
caused the death. One person might call what happened murder, whereas others might
think that the act was (or could be) socially desirable. The important point to note is
almost none of these cases fulfill the conditions for first-degree murder, and where
criminalized at all have much lesser penalties. In the current context, therefore, the
availability of death penalty is not relevant to the rate at which such acts are performed.
The most likely socially desirable act that can be confused with first degree
murder is probably self-defense or defense of others, wherein socially acknowledged
negatives such as injury or death are forestalled by getting the other fellow (the truly bad
actor) before he can commit them. However, any confusion that will occur in the justice
system will be between cases where lethal force was justified and where some force was
justified, but not lethal force. If the system confuses the former with the latter, somebody
may be convicted who committed a socially desirable act, and the possibility of this
confusion will presumably cause people to be more cautious (than they should be) about

33

From a strictly utilitarian view, it is arguable that some murder victims are themselves “undesirables”
whose existence imposes positive harm on the communities in which they live. Perhaps an example might
be gang members killing one another. If we increase the sanction for killing generally, deterrence will save
bad people from an untimely death along with “good” people. Nevertheless, vigilantism is a strained
interpretation of what we consider socially desirable – the optimal level of this activity is usually thought to
be near zero.

22
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

defending themselves with lethal force. However, in many states such persons have
recourse to an imperfect self-defense plea and will not be eligible for first-degree murder
(or at least, it will serve as a mitigating factor to prevent their being eligible for the death
penalty). The rate therefore of socially desirable acts of this type lost to excessive
precaution is more dependent on the sanctions applied to manslaughter, not to murder.
There are non-killing acts that are deterred by sanctions for intentional killing
with malice aforethought, but they are generally socially undesirable as well, both
because they carry the risk of death and intrinsically. For instance, an individual on trial
may argue that they did not “intend” to kill their victim – they only intended to beat them
“within an inch of their life” and “accidentally” the victim died when the extra “inch”
was taken. Or, a rapist may partially strangle their victim in order to control them during
the commission of the sexual assault, but “accidentally” the victim struggles and ends up
with a broken neck. Or, a robber may not intend to use their weapon to carry out the
robbery, but because the victim had a gun, the robber “had to” shoot to defend his own
life. The risk a death will result from these activities, and that it will be punishable by the
sanction associated with first-degree murder, means these activities will be engaged in at
a rate that falls with the sanction for first-degree murder. Since these activities are
harmful, though, this is a simply a social benefit, and will not decrease the level of the
optimal sanction. 34

34

Not all the foregoing examples would actually be prosecuted according to the theory of felony murder;
however the reasoning about the absence of an overdeterrence problem applies a fortiori to circumstances
where the predicate offense involved an actual intentional assault. Therefore the analysis of felony-murder
is generally relevant: “In the felony-murder context, we need not be concerned with the overdeterrence
problem. We would regard as a benefit any effect the felony-murder rule had on deterring individuals from
committing the underlying felony. Because the felony-murder rule does not operate against those who are
engaged in activities that ‘are closely allied with and easily confused” with noncriminal conduct, the
overdeterrence problems … are absent.” Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a Discriminating
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More problematic is the additional social cost required to implement a capital
sentence. For most ordinary crimes, social cost scales rather naturally with the extent of
a sanction. If we imprison someone for one year, society is on the hook for a year’s
worth of room, board, guarding and so on, and there is a loss of one year’s worth of
economic productivity (if any) of the inmate. If we increase the sentence to five years,
multiplying the one year cost by five is at least a good first approximation of social cost.
Since it costs many thousands of dollars to imprison people, long prison terms for petty
crimes are usually inefficient. Death, as they say, is different; it is very cheap to kill
someone, but very expensive to obtain the right to kill someone. As far as costs intrinsic
to the penalty are concerned, death sentences are cheaper than life imprisonment, a
unique inflection in our scale of sanctions.
As a practical matter, it may be that the social cost of a death sentence, associated
as it is with intense expenditure of legal resources, is in fact more costly than life
imprisonment. Estimates vary between one and two million dollars a death penalty
case; 35 this is the price society pays for putting somebody on death row. In addition,
because most death row inmates serve long prison sentences under more expensive
conditions of confinement 36 only a small amount of savings are realized relative to a life
sentence and it is generally thought this cannot compensate for the fixed cost of obtaining
a death conviction. These cost factors, though, are pure products of a legal system of

Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 102 (1990)(quoting Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers,
Martyrs, and Criminals, Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 325
(1984))
35
See Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV.,
1, 12-14 (1995)
36
Although there were 16,503 criminal homicides in 2003 (the latest year for which the FBI fully reports),
there were only 144 people sentenced to execution, and only 65 people actually executed. THOMAS P.
BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2003, Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 1
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm#cp.
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capital adjudication that is widely considered to be bizarrely convoluted, drawn out and
inefficient. It is very hard to know what the additional net cost would be if this system
were adequately reformed. Assuming that some additional procedure is appropriate when
moving between a life sentence and a death sentence, it is unclear to what extent this
fixed cost would be balanced by the decreased cost which occurs when a convict only
spends one or two years on death row rather than the current several or more years, and in
comparison with the decades of confinement and care (including medical care in old age)
that are associated with life without parole. Because of the contingent nature of these
costs, what follows will assume that although it is no cheaper to apply a death sentence
(which might encourage us to resort to it more readily than a life sentence), it is also not
prohibitively more expensive so long as there is a meaningful level of deterrence
associated with it.
The justification behind this assumption is that even a one or two million dollars
increment is usually deemed to be insufficient in social policy making to justify the loss
of a life.37 If the coefficient of deterrence is therefore above 1, and each execution results
in saving one life, then execution is socially desirable. If the coefficient of deterrence is
below 1, we probably cannot capably distinguish the coefficient from zero, and whether
or not the death penalty is implemented loses much of its urgency. Because human lives
are sufficiently valuable – following the practice of assigning commonplace values of one
million dollars or more even to the economically less valuable members of society – they
shift the debate from cost to what is the proper coefficient for capital punishment’s
37

The current estimates used by the federal government in making regulatory decisions are between 5 and
6.5 million. See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005). A
“market” based evaluation, compiled by the same authors through examination of jury awards for wrongful
death, and excluding outliers, indicates that the price assigned is somewhat under $3 million. See id. Even
this lower figure is well above the incremental cost of a death trial.
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deterrent effect. Perhaps we as a society should not have to pay extra to obtain a death
sentence. Assuming we do pay extra though, it is not particularly relevant, because if
capital punishment has a deterrent effect at all, it is deterring the loss of something
valuable enough to pay extra for.
The central inquiry therefore returns to the extent to which an increase in sanction
reduces the number of murders committed. In the way I will shortly define, this amount
of reduction represents the “marginal deterrence” of capital punishment. “Marginal
deterrence” has come to mean two distinct, if related things, in the criminal deterrence
literature. On the one hand, following Stigler, Shavell and others have defined this to
mean the effect on the level or intensity of some ongoing criminal activity. 38 To take the
classic example, the more violent and brutal someone is carrying out a robbery or rape,
the higher the sanction will normally be if they are caught.39
According to this view of “marginal deterrence,” the scaling of sanctions in this
way has an efficiency justification, because even if B increases with the force applied, it
may increase more slowly than C + A*P, and those not totally deterred may still have an
incentive to do less harm. In Figure 1, this usual model has been sketched for a
hypothetical crime. The criminal uses force up to the level after which (1) is no longer
satisfied and continued force would be unprofitable. This is sometime before point F,
where force becomes lethal. If, it is usually argued, the curve for sanctions was flat and
all crimes of this type had similar punishments, most particularly if one followed the
traditional law and punished all felonies with capital punishment, then there would be no

38
39

George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526-527 (1970).
See Shavell, supra note 22, at 1232.
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“marginal deterrence,” causing criminals to desist at some pre-lethal level of violent force
(although if C rose with force, there would be some of this).
Figure 1

C +A*P

F

B

Force Applied by D
The model illustrated in Figure 1 is useful for explaining certain features of the
criminal justice system, but it seems less useful for many types of murder, where the
benefit that accrues to the killer is wholly derived from his application of maximum force
to the victim. This creates a step function and a solution illustrated in Figure 2. There is
no “Stigler deterrence” with this assumption about the benefit curve to the perpetrator,
where we can assume that optimal force is above point F, the level of lethal force. In
addition, even as to murders that take place within the context of other felonies, there
seems to be a behavioral error with regard to the Stigler model, because the goods
produced by additional criminal activity are generally distinct from those generated by
the earlier activity. Consider for instance a rapist who applies a certain level of violence
to perform the rape and thereby get whatever satisfaction might be obtained from coerced
sex. They are then at the choice point of whether to kill the victim. Although there are of
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course psychosexual sadists whose satisfaction is directly proportionate to the harm
inflicted, these are not the norm even among sex criminals. 40 (For such persons, there is
presumably Stigler deterrence). The usual rapist, when considering whether to kill, is
considering a quite separate problem from the further slaking of their lusts, namely
whether they need to shut the victim up in order to avoid apprehension. The benefits and
costs of force at this point are more likely to resemble Figure 2 than Figure 1.
Figure 2

C +A*P

F

B
Force Applied by D

One does not have to abandon an individual rational choice perspective to take
this view; a person who is a potential murderer will face a series of varying provocations,
incentives, and risks for each killing opportunity. The question will be whether these
ever reach the level of profitability (or for multiple murderers, how often they do). By
altering the level of P, we deter undesirable acts by making it less likely that (1) is
satisfied; how much less likely is reflected in a reduction in the murder rate. This can be
40

See Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist
Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B. U. L. REV. 127, 157 (2001) (reviewing evidence of the nonpsychopathic nature of rapists).
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illustrated in Figure 3, where three different defendants face a choice, and where an
increased sanction for murder, going from P1 to P2, applied at F, deters Defendant 2.
Alternatively, the three different benefit curves, B1, B2, and B3, might characterize three
different sets of circumstances for a defendant repeatedly presented with a choice of
whether to kill. Defendant 1 is deterred by the ordinary regime of sanctions. Defendant 3
gains sufficient benefits from applying lethal force so that even the additional increment
in sanctions applied to murder does not deter him.
Figure 3
C +A*P2

B3
B2

Sanction increased from P1 to P2

B1

C +A*P1
F

B1, B2, B3

Force Applied by D1, D2, D3
All three of these defendants are very bad people who are restrained from killing,
if at all, by the legal system we construct with them in mind. We know there are people
like Defendant 1 – people who would gain a benefit from killing another person but who
are deterred by what we might call a standard punitive regime consisting of a lengthy
prison term.

We know there are people like Defendant 3, because murders keep

occurring in every jurisdiction and some people are neither deterrable by a standard
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punitive regime, nor by an increased sanction for murder, P2 (not to hide the ball here,
let’s call this increased sanction “capital punishment”). Another way to rephrase the
basic question in the death penalty debate is whether there is anybody like Defendant 2,
or alternatively, whether a potential killer is ever describable as Defendant 2?
The number of people like Defendant 2 who commit the undesirable act of
murder when P = P1, but not when P = P2, measured at the same violent activity level, F,
are the individuals I will consider as marginally deterred by the increase in sanction. In
some cases these individuals will have been committing other crimes and their
unwillingness to kill will appear as a “limit” on the intensity of their criminality; in other
cases, probably most cases, “marginal deterrence,” as I am using the term, will involve
people who commit no crime at all (at least that day). By contrast, the absolute
deterrence effect when P=P2 encompasses both Defendant 1 and Defendant 2. 41 Finally,
the number of undeterrable persons is represented by those like Defendant 3.

To the

extent a choice to kill is represented by the middle curve outlined on Figure 3, the
outcome of that choice will be determined by whether or not capital punishment is the
expected sanction. The number of choices characterized by the bottom curve is largely
unknown to us and must be inferred – it is the benefit we get from having a penal system
generally. The expected marginal reduction in the murder rate is dependent on the
relative ratio of the number of choices best characterized by the middle curve in Figure 3
and the top curve in Figure 3. If nobody – or more strictly, no decision analysis – is
characterized by the middle curve, then there will be no reduction in the murder rate.

41

For a similar usage, see Donald S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence Research at the Outset of the TwentyFirst Century, 23 CRIME & JUSTICE 1,3-4 (1998)
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That the set of defendants like Defendant 2 is an empty set is an implicit assumption of
people assuming no marginal deterrence effect for capital punishment.
If deterrence is admitted at all with regard to criminal sanctions, it is difficult to
deny theoretically the plausibility of a death penalty sanction deterring serious murders,
at least with regard to premeditated deaths or felony murders. In order to do so, it would
seem that one must demonstrate that a different type of decision process is occurring for
murders – as opposed to other premeditated acts, and for felonies that resulted in death –
as opposed to those felonies that, adventitiously, did not result in death. On the face of it,
these distinctions seem unlikely to be generally true. In particular, although deliberation
is not the strong suit of violent felons, the choice to murder must usually involve a
serious contemplation of risks and benefits, scaling at least with the amount of time spent
in determining how one can best go about it.
Generally, the more reasonable parts of the death penalty debate admit “a”
penalty upon murder acts as a deterrent to its commission, so that if the choice is between
the death penalty and no penalty at all, the death penalty deters. That is, they admit the
existence of Defendant 1. This follows from the empirical evidence of the basic
proposition that the presence of a cost, attached to a crime, causes fewer of such crimes to
be committed. 42 Usually a claim the death penalty does not “deter” may be taken to mean
there is a lack of proof it “deters better than” some alternative lesser sanction. Likewise,
for those who claim that the death penalty does provide deterrence for crime – they are
not making (what ought to be) the trivial claim that potential criminals may be forestalled

42

For a review of this evidence, including time-series, perceptual, and ecological studies, see Nagin, supra
note 41, at 3 and passim (concluding that “the evidence for a substantial deterrent is much firmer than it
was fifteen years ago” and “the collective actions of the criminal justice system exert a very substantial
deterrent effect”).
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by fear of death. 43 Both sides, instead are speaking of the marginal deterrence supposed
by one side to occur upon the “increase” of the penalty for certain kinds of murder from
life imprisonment (which for simplicity’s sake I will assume to be without the possibility
of parole) to execution, as this is applied to the decision of the potential perpetrator.
Slightly more formally, and put in behavioral rather than aggregate terms, the
hazard that a person, D, will commit a murder, Q, all else equal, given that the cost to the
offender, upon arrest and conviction for murder, is a function of the imposition of life
imprisonment, P1. This is based on the chance, given that P=P1, circumstances will arise
such that (1) is satisfied, where his optimal response is lethal force. Translated to Figure
3, this includes the aggregate probability that D’s benefit curve will be above the
corresponding cost curve, the chance that either B1 or B2 accurately describes D’s choice.
This gives as the conditional probability:
(3)

H1 = prob(Q)D| f(P1)

Here murder is defined as the presence or absence of an event in some time period over
which we observe the behavior of D, a potential murderer. The corresponding hazard,
where total cost is a function of the imposition of an execution punishment, is represented
by the chance that D’s benefit curve is B3 and that he is undeterrable. Cost is given by
f(P2), and combined with the chance of being above the cost curve, gives the conditional
probability:
(4)

H2 = prob(Q)D| f(P2)

There seems to be some consensus that although P1 and P2 are denominated quite
differently, f(P2) > f(P1) such that a change in f(P) over the range from P1 to P2 is
43

See Allan D. Johnson, Note, The Illusory Death Penalty: Why America’s Death Penalty Process Fails to
Support the Economic Theories of Criminal Sanctions and Deterrence, 52 HASTINGS L. J. 1101, 1112
(2001).
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positive, ∆ f(P) > 0. This view is reflected by the greater slope in the modified line at
point F in Figure 3. For an individual the question of whether the death penalty deters is
whether H2 is less than H1, or if one prefers, whether:
(5)(a) ∆ H/∆ f(P) < 0 |P1 ≤ P ≤ P2 Deterrence
(5)(b) ∆ H/∆ f(P) ≈ 0 |P1 ≤ P ≤ P2 No Deterrence
Collectively, for the death penalty to show substantial deterrence there must be
enough killing decisions where 5(a) is true, where capital punishment is the difference
between life and death (for the potential victim), or to restate the graphical formulation,
where curve B2 represents the most accurate description of the costs and benefits of the
actor . Retentionists maintain that (5)(a) is satisfied in the jurisdiction they are analyzing,
while abolitionists maintain that (5)(b) is the correct form 44 or perhaps more often, that
the retentionists have failed to show change in H significantly different from zero (which
of course, is not quite the same thing as empirical validation of (5)(b)). Represented in
the following simple figure 4, and ignoring as irrelevant any variant hypotheses about
deterrence prior to P1, the debate is over the slope of the line from P1 to P2. If an
individual decisionmaker is sensitive to the difference between P1 and P2, then there will
be fewer circumstances in which benefits of lethal force exceed its intrinsic and socially

44

At one time, and still occasionally, abolitionists promoted the view that, in fact, capital punishment
actually caused more people to kill, usually explaining this counter-intuitive result by arguing that the death
penalty “brutalized” people, making them more comfortable with killing. Brutalization theorists did not
usually deny that, on a direct trade-off basis, execution was perceived as worse than imprisonment. Rather,
they argued that the desensitized, lawless population would react less to all kinds of legal and non-legal
(conscience-based) restraints on behavior, and thus have its entire cost curve for murder lowered. In
economic terms, this discounting of murder’s costs would act as a subsidy, raising the probability of crime.
Shifts in the cost-curve are certainly worth exploring, at least if one expands one’s view of the potential
causes of brutalization beyond the death penalty, and they might well be a way to model differing rates of
murder between societies. However, the brutalization process as just described is not much argued for
nowadays, and I will ignore it here in favor of a more thorough discussion of the present debate, between
those who advocate 5(a), and those who advocate 5(b), as the correct assumption for legal policy-making.
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imposed costs, reducing the hazard that someone will kill. If the number of lethal force
decisions is held constant, then this reduced individual hazard will translate into a
reduced social hazard, i.e., there will be a lower murder rate per capita.
Figure 4

Hazard

“RETENTIONIST”
LINE

of

Range of Rival
Hypotheses of
Functional Relation

Murder

“ABOLITIONIST”
LINE
P1

P2

Penalty for Murder

II. Trading Life for Death
If the problem of the death penalty has now been restated as about the slope of
line in an implicit model of sanction, this is hardly surprising, but to what extent has it
advanced the debate, given that we seem to be left once again only with rival intuitions?
One way to assess the relative plausibility of the intuitions is to look more closely at the
actual difference in cost between life and death, which the model leaves unnecessarily
and damagingly vague. As mentioned above, the difference between a life sentence and a
death sentence is not the same as between a one year sentence and a five year sentence, or
even between a five year sentence and a life sentence. Do we think that with regard to
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the imposed cost, f(P2) > f(P1), the cost imposed by execution is much greater than the
cost imposed by life imprisonment? Or are we to suppose that it is only slightly greater?
Any deterrent effect, ∆H, will scale with increasing differential between f(P1) and f(P2),
which places demands on specifying them more precisely.
(6)

(∆H′ > ∆H) Æ (∆f(P)′ > ∆f(P))

At the limit, where there was only infinitesimal difference between life in prison
and execution, 5(b) would almost certainly be correct, because a miniscule change in they
x-axis would be matched by a minuscule change in the y-axis, regardless of the true
slope of the line. By contrast, if there is a great difference in perceived utility loss
between life in prison and death, and one takes seriously the idea of deterrence generally
(indicating a monotonically negative function should relate sanctions to the likelihood of
committing an act), then the absence of some detectable slope – and a corresponding
deterrent effect – becomes harder to accept, because we have to believe the slope of the
sanction function has become not just fairly flat, but very close to zero over an extended
portion of the range of the function.
A. The Intensity of Revealed Preference For Life, By Those Sentenced To Death
An approximation of the set of very bad people for whom we design the law of
capital murder is provided by those who are convicted of the same. Of course there is a
selection bias in this, because they consist only of the subset of very bad people who did,
after all, decide to kill, who then proceeded to get caught, and had the misfortune to be in
a jurisdiction and before a jury that handed them a death sentence. Still, it is inarguable
they belong to the group we are concerned to regulate, and their opinion about how much
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they value their own skin can tell us something about whether execution is a meaningful
addition to the social tax we impose on killing.
In general, those convicted of capital murder have the option of choosing to
abandon their appeals and accepting execution – those who do are referred to as
“volunteers” and constitute a significant fraction of the people executed in those states
where very few people are executed, but a much lower fraction where executions are
routine and the process does not require the acquiescence of the defendant. 45 The most
obvious evidence the death penalty is perceived as worse by the relevant population is
provided by the fact that the vast majority of death row inmates do not become
“volunteers.” According to Blume’s recent tabulation, there were 106 successful
“volunteers” from 1977 to 2003. 46

The relevant comparative population is not the

number of people involuntarily executed, which is only seven times as large (786); 47
rather it more closely approximates those who are continuing to “fight” their death
sentence, which surely constitutes a fair proportion of those people who have ever been
sent to death row, 7061 between 1977 and 2003. 48
Some of these individuals remain in the process of appealing their conviction, so
their relevant choice was freedom versus death, and they did not reach the point of
contesting directly between life in prison and a death sentence; we do not know if they
would be “volunteers.” So 106/7061 would be an overestimate, but not a large one;
Blume’s data shows a maximum of twelve volunteers per year (in 1999); 49 this in a year

45

See John H. Blume, Killing the Willing: “Volunteers,” Suicide, and Competency, 103 MICH L. REV. 939,
959 (2005)
46
Ibid.
47
See id. at 961.
48
THOMAS P. BONCZAR AND TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 2003, supra note 36, at 1.
49
Blume, Killing the Willing, supra note 45, at 959.
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when 272 death sentences were handed down. 50 Taking this as a conservative estimate of
the relative preference for life over death, 4.4% of the relative population will
“volunteer” but in excess of 95% of death row inmates would prefer to stay alive, thank
you very much.
Gary Gilmore revealed an understandable preference when he told the Supreme
Court “he did not ‘care to languish in prison for another day.’” 51

If all potential

murderers had the preference set of a Gary Gilmore, the deterrence rationale for capital
punishment would simply collapse, because its core assumption of an incremental
disincentive would be violated. This would, incidentally, create at least a rhetorical
problem for the abolitionist cause, as arguments used against the death penalty frequently
portray it as being more severe, 52 a position contradicted by its being chosen voluntarily.
But Gilmore’s set of preferences, which are not per se insane or inconsistent, 53 appear to
be quite unusual.
This is by no means an obvious result. Despite the overwhelming confinement
emphasis of our penal system, it is not dictated by necessity, much less by the unanimous
assent of convicts. The Romans, for instance, thought of life in prison as worse than the

50

TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, 1999 Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin 1 available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cp99.pdf
51
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1015 n.4 (1976) (rejecting the appeal of Gilmore’s mother to stop his
execution by firing squad). The law on voluntary relinquishment supposedly prevents such choices being
made due to the “duress” caused by conditions of imprisonment, which is understandable as a legal rule to
avoid incentives for recreating medieval prisons. Nonetheless, if prisoners were treated like Napoleon after
Waterloo, and given their own Mediterranean island to rule as emperor, they would not prefer death.
52
This is not necessarily inconsistent with the rejection of substantial deterrence. The abolitionist point is
that, under a non-deterrence hypothesis, this increased imposed cost is especially egregious because it
brings about no corresponding social benefit. Although the convict pays the cost, murderers are supposedly
sufficiently insensitive to cost such that they will not be deterred.
53
See, e.g., Harper v. Parker, 177 F.3d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting attempt of Kentucky Department
of Public Advocacy to intervene and stop execution when testimony showed the convict was “competent
and that his determination to have counsel discharged and not to proceed with filing a habeas petition is
based on his desire not to have to live in prison for the rest of his natural life”).
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death penalty, 54 and few premodern civilizations even had prisons. Where there were
prisons, the abysmal conditions of confinement (usually leading to an unpleasant slow
death through disease, malnutrition, overwork and exposure) and the omnipresent shame
and indignity could easily cause expectations of the future utility derivable from any
future period to dip below zero. Such negative prospects make rational any action that
will avoid these costs, including suicide. 55 Even under current prison conditions, a “life
sentence” adds considerable extra risks of mortality in comparison with living on “the
outside,” 56 whereas a “death sentence” de facto consists of a long stretch of
imprisonment combined with an extra mortality risk created by an unpredictable legal
process that might choose to actually execute in some particular year. In other words, the
penalties are not nearly as distinct as one might suppose – yet capital convicts usually do
distinguish them.
In order to determine whether to choose life imprisonment over the death penalty,
a convict will assess the expected utility that they will receive in the prison environment
over the period of their natural life. For sake of simplicity, suppose the decision is just
whether or not to pursue a legal strategy that will delay execution and allow the prisoner
to survive into the next time period, x+1. Using conventional demographic form, an
individual has an exogenous probability px of surviving from their current age x into the

54

See Russ VerSteeg, Law and Justice in Caesar’s Gallic Wars, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 571, 575 (2004)
(noting that Julius Caesar, when acting as magistrate expressed this inverse view of the relative harshness).
55
A distinction that may be noted between Roman and common law practice is that in the former, actual
suicide was frequent, if conviction or a lighter sentence (such as exile) was unavoidable. Influenced by
Christian tradition, individuals in the common law were ingrained with prohibitions against suicide
(prohibitions enforced to some extent by post-mortem humiliation of the body and family of the suicide).
Therefore, even if an individual preferred death, there were certain barriers to implementing this desire.
56
See Katz, Levitt, & Shustorovich, Prison Conditions, Capital Punishment, and Deterrence, supra note 3,
at 323. Although Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich argue that death rates in prison provide a stronger
deterrent than execution, they do not deny that execution might have some effect- they claim to have been
unable to come to an empirical conclusion about it.
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next time period x+1. During that period they will experience (or rather, expect) a certain
amount of utility, Ux+1. Apart from any other discount rate applied to this future utility
stream, the value expected from this period, E, must be discounted for the possibility that
the potential recipient will die of some other cause than execution.
(7)

E = px • Ux+1

Execution prior to x+1 reduces px = 0, and therefore (E| execution) = 0. An
individual would therefore prefer execution only when (E| ~ execution) < 0, and since px
is a probability that can vary only between 0 and 1, this can occur only when Ux+1 < 0. In
other words, people choose to die when life, even if you get it, is not worth living. This
may seem trivial, but is worth establishing at the beginning of developing a model of
punishment cost.
The total amount of expected utility in the person’s remaining lifespan is
determined by the potential to survive to some age, lx (which is the product of the joint
probabilities of surviving all preceding periods, p0 • p1 … • px-1). This chance of living to
age x is multiplied by the utility one gains at that age if in fact you live long enough to
enjoy it, Ux. The utility times the survivorship, lx • Ux, is then totaled by is summing
across all future time periods (x varies from current age to extreme old age) to give
expected value of the remaining lifespan, V. 57

57

The above formula adapts the reproductive value equation generally used in biology, although it is also
related to various models of human capital. A biological equation would divide the summation by the
survivorship probability to the individual’s current age to account for the fact that they have, actually, beat
the odds so far and have greater expected value in the future years than was the case at their birth. Second,
utility would be directly replaced by biological fertility (mx) as the measure of the utility productivity of a
future time period. Since it is not necessary or possible in this current work to discuss the extent to which
utility tracks this objective measure in human beings, the conventions of economics are usually adhered to
instead. I would note that punishment by confinement, like punishment by death, successfully suppresses
reproduction by preventing sexual contact with the opposite sex, and more generally, activity that would
allow accumulation of resources. I need not defend that this is why at a fundamental level prison is
experienced as unpleasant. Such motivation is usually unconscious; cases such as Gerber v. Hickman,
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(8)

V = ∑ (lx • Ux)

The current form of (8) is useful insofar as it shows there is a fairly specific
meaning to lifetime utility and what one sacrifices at death. For the sake of simplicity,
we can ignore the changes in lx and Ux that may occur at different ages, as well as the
structure of the equation, and simply note that V is a positive function of l and U.
(9)

V = f (l, U)

∆V/∆l > 0

∆V/∆U > 0

Presumably the problem with incarceration is that the utility of a period spent in
prison is less than the utility derivable from a period unincarcerated, or else prison would
not be as undesirable it is; 58 in addition, a lowered life expectancy within prison may
make it less attractive. If V is the lifetime expected utility as a free man, then set V′
equal to the utility derived from an imprisoned natural life, based on the altered prison
variables, l′ and U′. We could also assess V given execution, but we know it already as a
generalization from (7): all future periods produce zero utility if you are dead, so V upon
application of capital punishment falls to zero. With these definitions we are now ready
to specify f(P1) and f(P2), and thereby ∆f(P).
(10)(a)

f(P1) = V - V′

(10)(b)

f(P2) = V

(10)(c)

∆f(P) = V′

where the prisoner, a “lifer,” sought to use the Constitution to impregnate his wife through artificial
insemination, are rare. The analogy nevertheless goes slightly beyond the formal one, and suggests that the
en banc opinion in Gerber was on the right track when it held procreation to be inconsistent with
incarceration, given “the nature and goals of the correctional system, including isolating prisoners,
deterring crime, punishing offenders, and providing rehabilitation.” Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617,
622 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing panel opinion in 264 F.3d 882, 890 (2001), which would have upheld the
constitutional right to ship sperm out of the penitentiary for reproductive purposes).
58
Although I would suspect them to be a smaller group than “volunteers,” it is possible that some people
might actually prefer prison to the world outside. I discuss this problem briefly, below, and suggest the
amount of utility such people are likely to be deriving is quite low, it not being so much that they like
prison, but that their unincarcerated life would be yet more unpleasant.
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We arrive at the conclusion that the deterrent effect of capital punishment per se
depends entirely on the length and quality of a life sentence. The value of one’s life as a
free person is irrelevant at the margin – although highly relevant to the deterrent effect of
life imprisonment. 59 To the extent existence in prison becomes progressively more lethal
or odious, the additional deterrence provided by a threat of execution goes away. This
creates a behavioral critique of the study of Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich on prison
conditions.

According to the present theory, bad prison conditions should relate

negatively to the marginal deterrent effect of execution, so their two primary regressors
of interest are related in a way they do not discuss. Indirectly, however, their study does
suggest such a relation, since they report a significant deterrent effect of capital
punishment on murder for later decades (post 1971) of more than 1/100,000. 60 Earlier
decades, however, show a much smaller (if any) effect on deterrence, in line with the
theoretical structure here proposed, since prison conditions as measured by mortality
were much worse during this early period. 61
In order to identify those people on whom capital punishment might have most
effect, we should thus look to those who still have something significant to lose, despite
being put in prison. That there are such people is again suggested indirectly by
volunteers, whose presence signals a certain level of variation in V′; we can infer that if
59

Thus someone who has a relatively shortened expectation of life, and/or low expectations for the
possibility of utility generation at future ages, will be less deterred by the threat of jail, and will commit
more crimes. For instance, Jack Ruby, who was dying, shot Lee Harvey Oswald, and the fact that Ruby was
dying no doubt lowered the expected loss from the social sanction, raising the benefit of the killing over its
costs. The commission of interpersonal crime, especially homicide, will have localized effects that reduce
the expected survivorship and economic security of surrounding individuals, reducing their own incentives
against criminal conduct. The existence of hypothetical environments containing such feedbacks may
warrant sociological investigation.
60
See supra note 3 at 335 (cautioning this effect. -1.15/100,000, is highly dependent on the econometric
model employed and highly variable)
61
See id. at 324 (general secular trend of improving conditions) and at 335 (pre-1971 coefficient is
estimated at approximately -.1, ten times lower than the mean of the fluctuating coefficient detected from
the modern death penalty era).
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there are persons within the death-sentenced population who are relatively less able to
bear incarceration, there also should be another group, who are relatively more able to
bear incarceration. For this latter group, V′ remains significantly different from zero,
and they therefore have the most to fear from death; consequently they are predicted to be
most deterred by capital punishment. 62 Naturally, there are general trends that affect the
difference between life in prison and execution, the general nature of prison conditions
being the most obvious one – the worse these are, the better life in prison serves as a
deterrent, and the worse execution will serve as a marginal deterrent.
The current model, in part because it is designed with the hope to focus the death
penalty more precisely, simply takes this one step further, to consider the individual
variation in the relative difference between life in prison, the policy implication being
that while it is pointless to threaten a Gary Gilmore with execution, and the usefulness of
the threat is debatable as to some other percentage of killers, there should exist a group
for whom the death penalty might be a particularly effective deterrent, regardless of the
background cost of prison conditions for the average inmate. Moreover, V′ is negatively
correlated with V - V′ (unless one assumes that these individuals are just naturally happy,
adaptable people who have better lives – higher V – outside the stir as well as in it).

62

If we were guided only by the above equations, we might suppose law professors to be a likely group on
whom to observe the marginal deterrence of threatened execution. Thanks to the beneficence of the
Supreme Court, prisons are provided with law libraries, so unlike other professionals, imprisoned law
professors may continue to practice their profession (from which they derive some modicum of
satisfaction), albeit in a more restricted fashion. Because of the legally charged atmosphere, there will also
be intellectual resources that would partially offset the loss of more traditional colleagues, particularly for
the empirically inclined scholar. Moreover, prisoners with pending or potential litigation, particularly those
in need of novel and untested legal theories, would likely show some solicitude for the well-being of the
law professor, leading to a less severe loss of life expectancy than might otherwise be imagined. I therefore
conclude that law professors should show particular distaste for capital punishment. Q.E.D. The only
trouble with this account is that law professors are rarely very bad men.
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Therefore (10)(a) will be lower than normal, as will be the deterrence provided by a life
sentence; they are people for whom only execution will do. 63
Figure 5
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Presumably, we would be looking for a group of individuals – let’s call them
“Toughs” – willing and able to use violence, and who are relatively comfortable in the
prison environment. Some limited evidence on this variation is provided by a four-year
field study conducted in Lorton Prison in the late 1980’s. 64 Although this research was
qualitative in nature, one of its chief conclusions was that the aversive nature of the
prison experience varied widely, with many individuals suffering serious mental distress
due to the high level of risk of injury and death and the “fear, uncertainty and boredom”
involved in incarceration; others, however, perceived the prison as at least a tolerable

63

The “desert” model of punishment would track this conclusion, since putting people into what amounts to
a “second home” for them is hardly commensurate with the punitive notion of desert.
64
See Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton’s Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment Justified,
42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1154 (1990). Lorton prison is in Virginia, but houses inmates convicted of serious
crimes with the District of Columbia, such as robbery, murder, rape, and narcotics offenses. Ibid. The
District of Columbia has no death penalty.
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place where they could “play basketball, get high, dress well, work out, have sex and
watch color television….” 65
Generally those having the easiest time are naturally the “toughest criminals who
committed the worst crimes” because they usually have established contacts for
contraband goods and services, supervisory positions in the prison work details, and can
effectively terrorize the “timid, short-term first offender[.]” 66 As relevant to our purposes
here, assuming this scale to be approximately correct, those experiencing a relatively
non-aversive environment would often include murderers in for long sentences,
especially those with prior prison experience, although other murderers for whom their
crime is not an outgrowth of a criminal career, may lack prison experience and suffer
greater than average costs for at least a certain period.
Noting again the selection bias (out of all potential murderers) that comes with
doing so, I will make do with relevant observations on two further subsamples for which
there is significant data, (1) death row inmates and (2) murder defendants more generally.
Keeping in mind the caveats expressed above about who enters these groups, it seems to
me useful to investigate whether it is possible to identify – as a preliminary to other
potential empiricism, perhaps – groups who have particularly high marginal costs for
death. These individuals, in their cost structure, are essentially the reverse of death
65

Blecker, Haven or Hell?, at 1216. One revealing inmate comment is that for some younger prisoners,
“life in prison is ‘pretty much the same as on the street. Their little honeys can come and see them; they
can sneak off and have a little sex here and there. Drugs when they want, get drunk when they want. They
can have personal clothing so they can dress similar to the way they did in the streets. Get up late. Pretty
much the same thing as at home. Somebody to look after them.” Id. at 1172. If this was in any way
accurate, it obviously greatly reduces the deterrent effect of the prison, with V′ converging toward V.
66
Id. at 1173. As noted by Blecker, who is sympathetic to the retributivist viewpoint, a moral desert model
of punishment would reject this pattern of prison suffering. It also provides an additional justification (from
either the retributive or deterrence view) for application of the death penalty if (and only if) a death-eligible
individual is likely to experience an abnormally easy time serving a life sentence. Cf. J. K. ROWLING,
HARRY POTTER AND THE PRISONER OF AZKABAN, 214 (1999) (“Black isn't affected by Azkaban like normal
people are. It’s not a punishment for him like it is for the others.”) (vigilante schoolboy arguing for death,
rather than return to life imprisonment, of convicted killer, in non death penalty jurisdiction)
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penalty “volunteers.”

For volunteers, V′ < 0, so death is preferable. We can assume

they represent one extreme end of a distribution, the bulk of which is greater than zero,
and whose mean is centered between zero and V. The right tail of the distribution can be
taken as V, 67 while the left tail is some arbitrary negative number. 68 The greater the
skew towards the right of the distribution in Figure 5, the greater predicted incentive for
the marginal deterrence of the death penalty.
One sample of death row inmates, already discussed, has been characterized at a
sufficient level to perhaps make certain distinctions. The 156 killers given clemency by
George Ryan were all given capsule profiles by the Chicago Tribune. 69 Although these
narratives are brief, they allow for more precise coding of the activities of the offender
that ultimately led to their capital crime, coding that can be cross-checked for most of
them by reference to state appellate opinions on their cases. Within this sample, there
appear to have been no “volunteers” who complained about the commutation. There
was, however, a blind spree-killer whose preference reversal between life and death is
recorded in his attempt to withdraw his unbargained-for guilty plea to capital murder. 70
The defendant, Ernest Jamison, had a busy day June 19, 1995; he began by killing a man

67

Hypothetically the tail extends out past V, to include those who may actually prefer long-term
imprisonment to life on “the outside.” There is some anecdotal evidence for this among persons whose V is
relatively low, but the percentage for whom V′ > V is likely small. Individuals of this type, because both V
and V′ are probably low, should not show an especially strong specific aversion to the death penalty
because they are insensitive to penalties generally. See Blecker, supra note 64, who reports inmate (and
rational calculator) Leo Simms as musing that “‘A person have to have something that you take away from
them, … but if you don’t got nothing, or consider what you have of any value or any importance, then you
ain’t took nothing from them.’”
68
One slightly less arbitrary way to left-censor the distribution would be to calculate the utility value
already accumulated by the offender from age 0 to the age of incarceration, V0. Negative utility periods
past this point could be assumed to accumulate until the individual reaches (- V0), at which point they wish
literally “that they had never been born.” This specifies a commonly uttered threat often considered to
have connotations of the maximum possible infliction of harm.
69
Available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205019.pdf and
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205191.pdf
70
See People v. Jamison, 756 N.E.2d 788, 790 (Ill. 2001).
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in Memphis, stealing his car, and heading north; on his way, he killed a gas station
attendant in Missouri, and when his first car broke down in Illinois, he shot a woman in
the head for her Honda. The Honda went into the ditch during a high speed chase with
the local sheriff, and when approached, Jamison turned the gun on himself.

This

indicates at least a momentary preference against incarceration in favor of death. 71
Jamison failed in his suicide attempt, but his gunshot to the head rendered him
blind, and contributed to him being depressed. He voluntarily changed his plea to guilty
and waived his right to a trial; a subsequent hearing found him eligible for the death
penalty. It was reported that “defendant became sad when he spoke about the future and
maintained he would rather die than go to prison because he was afraid of being
victimized in prison due to his blindness.” 72 There is no doubt that Jamison, at this point,
can be located at the left hand of the hypothetical distribution shown in Figure 5.
However, after a certain amount of treatment with anti-depressives, Jamison’s mood
improved; his boredom was relieved by provision of books-on-tape and music, and he
“attended Bible study sessions, wrote rap songs, and enjoyed witnessing his faith to his

71

See Blume, Killing the Willing, supra note 45, at 968 (“there are important similarities between persons
who commit suicide and those who volunteer for execution”). Of course, those who do not let the cops
take them alive are a special case – they are making in effect a penal choice that indicates their expectation
of V′, rather than the normal suicide, whose action reveals expectations about V < 0. Nevertheless, it is not
surprising if these were correlated, since if somebody already has a low expected value of V – little to live
for – a lifetime of incarceration is unlikely to improve their outlook on life. Formally speaking, a low V
indicative of those at risk for suicide makes them less resilient to the subtraction effected in (10)(a) as part
of the sanction of imprisonment and makes it more likely that V-V′ < 0, producing a potential volunteer.
Blume also appears puzzled by the racial disparity in volunteering, in that although 42% of death row
inmates are black, only 3% of volunteers are. See id. at 962 & n.120 (reporting this phenomenon has been
unanalyzed in the legal literature). Although there are no doubt many factors involved here, one
implication of the model is that if the greater organization of African-American gangs in prisons may
mollify the effects of incarceration, reducing its cost, volunteering becomes less likely for those who are (or
who are, at least, eligible to be) a member of such a gang; in addition, black defendants have recourse to
some legal arguments based on racial discrimination that might potentially overturn their conviction, a
strong incentive to stay alive.
72
People v. Jamison, 756 N.E.2d at 793.
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fellow inmates.” 73 It is plausible to conclude that Jamison now had something to live for,
therefore subjectively determined V-V′ > 0, no longer wished to die, and hence
(unsuccessfully, as it turned out) attempted to withdraw his plea. At this point, Jamison
can be placed over the zero line – but perhaps not much over this line.
Other inmates can be inferred to further out on the distribution hypothesized in
Figure 5. For instance, here is the skinny on Victor Ganus, convicted 1990: “While
serving a life term for murder in 1988 at Menard Correctional Center, he stabbed and
strangled fellow inmate Lucas Gonzales in a gang dispute.” Next in alphabetical order on
the mercy list is Oasby Gilliam: “Kidnapped and robbed Aileen D’Elia, 79, of Chicago in
1992, then beat her with a tire iron and dumped her body in Downstate Jefferson
County.” 74 Neither the law that condemned them, nor the blanket executive clemency
that saved them, made any particular distinction between Mr. Ganus or Mr. Gilliam, who
I think it is not disparaging to remark are both very bad people. Nor did Ganus or
Gilliam abandon their appeals and show a preference for volunteerism, as did Jamison.
Nevertheless, as revealed by examining their cases, there is a difference between
them. Gilliam appears to be a typical economically motivated criminal with no particular
brief for killing old ladies, but also no particular compunction against doing so. 75 There
is no reason to believe he would find a life sentence particularly easy or hard, and
therefore at a guess we can place him at the middle of the cost distribution and probable

73

Id. at 798.
Available at http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205019.pdf and
http://www.chicagotribune.com/media/flash/2003-01/6205191.pdf
75
See People v. Gilliam, 670 N.E.2d 606, 612 (Ill. 1996) (victim was murdered as a potential witness after
Gilliam carjacked her in order to escape from a botched attempt to rob a liquor store). He drove with her
(locked in the trunk) for several hours as “he considered what to do with the victim.” Ibid. This is notable
as a counterexample to any claims that criminals lack the mental capacity or time to consider whether or
not to elevate their criminal activity to the level governed by maximum penalties.
74
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deterrability. 76 Mr. Ganus, on the other hand, seems to be a bit of harder nut – a “tough
criminal” of the type recorded by Blecker – and the murder for which he received his
death sentence was “part of his duty as cellhouse security chief for the Latin Kings
gang.” 77 Ganus was already serving a natural life sentence at the time for a 1985 murder
that he committed just forty-one days after getting out of a previous stretch in prison. 78
After one eliminates the four women among the 156 people, 152 men formerly on
Illinois death row remain as a sample. Of these 152, I coded 15 as committing their
principal crime as part of either gang activity and/or in pursuit of their commercial
activities as drug dealers.

Gang members and drug dealers, in most American

penitentiaries, have the opportunity to continue to pursue the same type of economic
activities they did while not incarcerated, thereby providing compensable services and
having a greater opportunity for utility generation than would be the case for the average
inmate. Because a substantial portion of the gang is imprisoned at any particular time,
and their rivalry with economically competitive gangs is positively affected by people
willing to act in capacities such as “cellhouse security chief,” the imprisoned gang
member – even the “lifer” – remains integral to overall economic life of the criminal
organization. Ceteris paribus, I suggest U′GANUS > U′GILLIAM, generating V′GANUS >
V′GILLIAM. The protection afforded by the gang in terms of survival probability may or
may not be offset by the greater exposure of the individual as a target from rivals, so we
76

Gilliam fled to Mississippi where he holed up with relatives, but appeared “restless and nervous” and
refused to specify what wrong, saying “If you only knew.” Id. at 611. After two months he returned to
Chicago by bus and requested his girlfriend arrange for his surrender to the authorities, to whom he
confessed his crime. See ibid.; cf. FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1866).
77
People v. Ganus, 594 N.E.2d 211, 212 (Ill. 1992) (the victim supposedly had “raped the wrong [female
person] out on the street” and Ganus found it necessary to increase the penalty that had been imposed by
the justice system)
78
People v. Ganus, 706 N.E.2d 875, 878 (Ill. 1998). Expert psychological testimony established that Mr.
Ganus “had a tendency to be excessively absorbed with his own needs and insufficiently aware of the needs
of others. Defendant is impulsive, shows poor judgment and has difficulty controlling himself.” Id. at 877.
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perhaps can ignore that factor until more evidence is gathered on it. At least 10% of the
sample of capital convicts is therefore shifted right on the distribution by a retained
capacity to continue valuable economic activity.
Another subgroup from this sample that may be partially immunized by the effect
of the prison environment is the subgroup of killers who are also rapists; at least those
who while at liberty satisfied their desires using adult victims. 79

Including some

marginal cases who assaulted and killed teenagers, I identify 27 members of this
category, or about 20% of the sample. Arguably, because rape is unfortunately prevalent
in many correctional institutions, it is possible for these individuals to continue to some
extent an activity for which they revealed a preference while not incarcerated. It is true
that the majority of these men raped women, whereas in prison they will have access only
to other males as victims. However, opportunistic homosexuality is common in prisons
or other same-sex environments, demonstrating the substitutability of one good for
another. 80 More speculation is required here, but again, I would argue that those who
have the motivation and opportunity to engage in highly desired behavior will have a
higher retained utility upon imposition of a life sentence, and thus will be more
susceptible to the next step in penalization.

B. Revealed Preference For Life, By Those Eligible For Death
Those who are convicted of – or more often, plead guilty to – a murder eligible
for the death penalty, but who do not actually receive it, are no doubt more representative

79

Those who rape and kill children, anecdotally, have lower survivorship in prison, and may be subject to
disutility generated by fellow inmates. See Blecker, supra note 64, at 1172 (noting that “child molestation
or crimes against the elderly” may result in a prisoner being “ostracized or physically attacked”).
80
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 121 (1992).
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of the relevant regulated population than are death row inmates. However, this group
receives much less legal treatment (or attention from legal reformers and the bar), in part
because their sentences are generally not separately appealable, or they may have waived
appeal of their conviction and sentence as part of the exchange for avoiding a possible
death penalty. It is therefore more difficult to estimate to what extent they would mirror
the distributions estimated above or how they might reveal other aspects of the variability
in immunity to prison costs that I have suggested is at the heart of the question of
deterrence.
Nevertheless, studies of them reinforce the essential point that life is preferred to
death. The option of the death penalty gives prosecutors an important amount of leverage
in plea negotiations. With the exception of New York, where there are legal restrictions
on the use of this threat, it is said to be “the virtually universal day-to-day practice in
every other American death-penalty jurisdiction.” 81 The actual amount of leverage of
this threat, however, is specified by the same formal relations as have been sketched
above, since the amount a bargaining defendant would be willing to exchange (in terms
of possibility of acquittal or legal recourse) is highly dependent on the additional amount
of cost imposed upon them by a death sentence. 82 This in turn will vary according to the
individual’s expected quality and length of life in prison. Gary Gilmore, presumably
could assert, with Patrick Henry, “Give me liberty or give me death!” There would be no
prosecutorial leverage over such a defendant.
81

Joseph L. Hoffmann, Marcy L. Kahn, and Steven W. Fisher, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2316 (2000).
82
It is not wholly dependent because such negotiations take place prior to trial and the “death is different”
legal regime may allow certain prosecutorial advantages during the trial that could increase the chance of
conviction. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2097 (2001)
(describing the rationale for, as well as sharply criticizing, the practice of “overcharging” murder
defendants).
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Over the average defendant, however, the influence of the death penalty is
apparently quite substantial. In order to achieve a plea of life in prison without the
possibility of parole, where the trial outcome is uncertain, it is patent that there must be
some penalty that is perceived to be substantially in excess of life imprisonment, such
that a rational defendant chooses with certainty a result of f(P1). Indeed, it appears to be
essentially only those who are death-eligible who will accept, without adjudication, costs
of f(P1). 83 To simplify matters somewhat by ignoring the possibility of conviction on a
lesser charge than death eligible murder, and of avoiding the death penalty at the
sentencing phase, we get the following decision, which, when true, will result in
accepting a plea bargain.
(11)

V′ > Probacquittal* V

We can see that as prison conditions (V′) improve from the defendant’s subjective
viewpoint, the chance of taking a deal increases. The problem with this is that the
“Toughs” and most experienced inmates have the greatest incentive to take a deal,
although the optimal penalty for them is more likely to be the death penalty (from
society’s point of view) than other prisoners who fear incarceration more. Obviously,
when the chance of avoiding a death sentence falls, a plea becomes more attractive. The
chance (and the right side of (11)) would rarely fall to zero, however, given the vagaries
of the justice system, and this suggests defendants who take a “deal” of a natural life
sentence are usually giving up something of importance. The only reason why they
would act this way (and be professionally counseled to act this way by their lawyers) is
that the fear of even a relatively small chance of a death sentence operates as primary
determinant of their post-arrest litigation behavior.
83

See Hoffman, et al., supra note 81, at 2350.
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In a study of Nebraska capital punishment, Baldus and his colleagues analyzed
the results of 185 “death-eligible” murder cases. 84 For 96 of these cases, the death
sentence was not sought, often because of pretrial plea bargain. Of the remaining 89,
seventeen pled guilty at the guilt phase of the trial; this largely eliminated the risk of a
death sentence (only two of the seventeen received such a sentence), and so might be
thought of as an implicit equitable plea bargain, i.e., “throwing one’s self on the mercy of
the court.”

Of the seventy-two contested cases, however, 37% resulted in a death

sentence. Presumably those who are engaged in plea bargaining have some sense of their
chance for acquittal or for receiving a death sentence, and behave accordingly.
For those who fear a death sentence, a strong incentive is created that shifts the
bargaining outcome of the negotiation between the criminal defendant and the state,
resulting in a greater length of agreed-upon imprisonment than would be the case were
the death penalty not present in the background. The relevance of this phenomenon for
the deterrence debate is manifold. Most obviously, it strongly suggests that, controlling
for likelihood of acquittal, the sample of those who actually get on death row is biased
towards those killers who have the lowest marginal cost of death, and the lowest “quality
of life” in prison. These correlate with the incentive to conclude a plea bargain that
would avoid a death sentence in exchange for a longer period of term imprisonment or
for sacrificing the possibility of parole. This is perverse from both a deterrence and desert
perspective.
A perhaps more important consequence of considering bargaining is that, quite
against the intent of the critics who have generally examined these practices, the death
84

David C. Baldus et al., The Nebraska Death Penalty Study, An Interdisciplinary Symposium:
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical
Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973- 1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486 (2002).
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penalty is shown to have a far more pervasive effect among murderers than is commonly
assumed. The statistics showing a very small coterie of murderers actually receive the
death penalty radically underestimate the aggregate amount of additional cost imposed on
convicted murderers by the presence of the death penalty. The aggregate additional cost
it attaches to murder is composed not only of a small probability of offender death, but
also by the de facto increase in prison sentences implemented as prosecutor-favorable
shift in the bargained-for sentences that determine the penal outcome in the majority of
murder cases.
Because the probability of receiving P1 is a positive function of the probability of
receiving P2, then a reduction of the probability of receiving P2 to zero – as required by a
death penalty moratorium or abolition – is necessarily to assume that the probability of
receiving P1 rather than some lesser penalty, is irrelevant to the hazard of committing
murder. So long as the individual is at least plausibly eligible for the death penalty so it
is a credible threat – and this may include all, or nearly all, first-degree murderers 85 –
there is an expected increased cost from the death penalty, whether or not it is actually
sought, obtained, upheld, or carried out. We can therefore relax the range conditions
applied supra to the competing functional hypotheses in (5)(a) and (5)(b) and restate
them in a form requiring a stronger claim by proponents of abolition.
(12)(a)

∆ H/∆ f(P) < 0

Deterrence

(12)(b)

∆ H/∆ f(P) ≈ 0

No Deterrence

85

See Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme: Requiem for Furman? 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1330 (1997) (85% are death eligible); see also id. at 1340 (“the prosecutor can use
the death penalty threat against almost any defendant charged with first degree murder”). In Georgia,
Baldus and his colleagues indicate the comparable percentage is a near-identical 86%. DAVID C. BALDUS,
ET AL. (eds.), EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 268 n.31
(1990). The Florida system is more straightforward and simply makes first degree murder a potentially
capital crime, with the question of life imprisonment or a death sentence determined after conviction in the
guilt phase of the trial. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 638-639 (1989) (describing system).
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The anti-deterrence argument therefore becomes that much more difficult to
sustain, at least on a theoretical level. The change in expected costs for murder wrought
by the death penalty, it is now apparent, should be relevant to most murderers; that is,
there is much greater certainty than is commonly recognized that it will apply in some
cost-increasing fashion to any particular person contemplating murder. In addition, the
predicted extra years added on to sentences indicates that the aggregate cost differential
between death penalty and non-death penalty jurisdictions would seem to be higher than
mere elevation of mortality of a small fraction of the most heinous offenders.
Moreover, the non-deterrence thesis now requires, for there to be “no effect,” that
murderers are not only insensitive to the difference between death and life, but also do
not respond behaviorally to the difference between life with parole and life without, nor
to the difference between life and a term of years, nor distinguish between a longer term
of years and a shorter term of years, because the bargaining solution will be shifted in the
defendant’s favor when the chance of a death sentence falls to zero. All of these costshifts, and not just execution, are consequences of having the death penalty available.
Therefore, instead of merely asserting a zero slope at one point at the extremity of
the cost curve, as described supra in Figure 4, a thoroughgoing rejection of capital
punishment deterrence seems to require a much more general assertion of cost
insensitivity along the complete length of the curve relating costs of murder to the
likelihood of its commission. This is illustrated in Figure 6, where the implicit
“abolitionist line” from Figure 4 is reproduced for comparison with a new implicit line
that takes account of the bargaining process and therefore flattens out at a much earlier
stage. Because penalties to the left of point D, where death eligibility begins, will be
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applied with a greater average severity in a capital jurisdiction, one is forced to assume
that this greater average severity is irrelevant.
Figure 6

Hazard

“Death Eligible”
whether or not so charged

of
Murder

“ABOLITIONIST”
line w bargaining
“ABOLITIONIST”
line w/o bargaining
D

P1

P2

Penalty for Murder
There are three other, more qualitative, consequences of incorporating life and
death bargaining into the deterrence debate. First, it calls into doubt any attempt to fall
back upon the claim that a life sentence without parole is “just as good as” the death
penalty, 86 because even if this were true, the possibility of getting such sentences is not
independent of the death penalty; it seems necessary for death penalty abolitionists,
insofar as murder is concerned at least, to claim that the rational model of crime is
without meaning and penalties simply do not deter. Second, and related, is that the death
penalty’s effect during plea bargaining cannot be discounted as psychologically unlikely
because the rational faculties are overwhelmed by any “instinctive” reactions or

86

See, e.g., Johnson, The Illusory Death Penalty, supra note 43, at 1125, claiming “it is hard (if not
impossible) to argue that the death penalty, as currently administered, could possibly provide a significant
enough marginal deterrent over life imprisonment without parole to outweigh the death penalty’s exorbitant
deadweight losses.”
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unreasonable optimisms thought to accompany crime offenses. Rather, the increased
threat available to a death penalty jurisdiction is more “real” because the person is
already arrested, and it occurs during a negotiation conducted over an extensive period,
with the assistance of trained professional, on an obviously important matter, all
circumstances conducive to rational deliberation. Third, it provides another plausible
mechanism by which the death penalty – although rarely applied – could conceivably
enter the calculations of the rational criminal and cause him to refrain from, or at least be
more circumspect about, the choice to kill. 87 Although empirically this effect might be
difficult to note, since capital jurisdictions are generally “tough on crime” and have
higher de jure sub-capital penalties as well as de facto ones negotiated through leverage,
it might be worth further research to investigate whether the lack of a credible threat of
the death penalty, and/or plea bargaining practices that restrain the use of such a threat,
may influence any variation in the deterrent effect of the death penalty among capital
jurisdictions. 88

87

See, e.g. Johnson, The Illusory Death Penalty, supra note 43, at 1123 (arguing the “credibility of the
death penalty cannot possibly be maintained when so few persons who are sentenced eventually receive the
punishment”) Contra Johnson, as long as there is a realistic chance of actually receiving the death sentence
if one goes to trial, and of then being executed, it should influence the calculations of murderers who take a
plea deal and have it within their control to avoid being one of the unlucky ones on death row. In fairness,
however, there are probably some “death penalty states” where the sanction is so rarely applied or where
judicial resistance to its execution is so strong, that practically speaking, only “volunteers” or possibly
individuals whose cases are a cause célèbre among the public stand any realistic chance of being executed,
regardless of their procedural choices. The question a potential murderer would ask is whether someone
“like me” has been executed in the state; if the answer is “yes” then the mortality risk has to be factored in.
88
See Joanna M. Shepherd, Deterrence versus Brutalization: Capital Punishment's Differing Impacts
Among States, 104 Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2005). Shepherd finds a “brutalization effect,” see supra
note 44, in several putative death penalty states where few executions actually take place, but a deterrent
effect in most of the states where nine or more people have been executed. (She finds an overall national
deterrent effect.) A brutalization effect anywhere is contrary to the current theory. One possible hypothesis
to consider might be that, in terms of signaling, if it becomes widely known and publicized, in the context
of the rare and drawn out capital case, that a particular state “will not, without great difficulty, kill” anyone,
this might send a signal encouraging crime. The potential killer might reason that a prosecutorial death
penalty threat is not only without any credibility, but that if the death penalty were actually obtained at trial,
it would mobilize judicial and public sympathy and procedural scrutiny such that his prison conditions
might improve and his underlying conviction as well as sentence might be overturned. Thus it would not
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III. Applications
Because we should expect to see an additional deterrent effect among hardened
(in the way described above) and potentially lethal criminals, econometric results
showing a general deterrent effect of executions are consistent with theoretical
expectations. Those studies showing no such effect would seem to require a behavioral
explanation for why the general process of cost-benefit decision making does not apply
for murderers before they commit their crimes, despite the fact that it influences their
decisions after they are apprehended, during the trial process, and during their
incarceration. It seems implausible, for instance, that criminals simply assume
unrealistically they will get away with their crime, and only become cognizant of the risk
of death penalty when caught, given that the majority of murders in the United States do
in fact result in arrest.
A fuller behavioral model may assist econometric modeling, most particularly by
indicating that the primary source of deterrence will be located among a particular subset
of potential murderers. It further predicts that efficient communication of the fear of
death to this group may determine how effective the death penalty will be. This should
focus both research and the judicial system on identifying this group of relatively
resistant to incarceration individuals. In addition, since deterrence works through the
threat of death by law – rather than directly by the executions that keep this threat
credible – a better independent predictor for the murder rate may be how often this threat
is credibly made by the law to the relevant persons, rather than how many executions are
carried out.
truly be “brutalization” that increases murder in these states, but rather the criminal response to the
perceived sympathy and public uproar provoked by introduction of the death penalty, which sends signals
to killers of a pro-defendant orientation within a jurisdiction.
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As discussed, plea bargaining converts the threat of death into greater years of
imprisonment, and this shifts the focus of the death penalty debate back to questions of
the efficacy of deterrence generally, at least in part. Some part of the death penalty
deterrence must arise from its effect in plea bargaining, but we will not understand the
extent of this secondary effect until we know in more detail to what extent a death threat
increases the mean penalty; specifically, we need to know how many additional years it
adds, and in addition, how costly these additional years are to potential murderers. Such
knowledge would have the side benefit of separating out the deterrent effects present in a
“tough on crime” state that mandates longer sentences generally for crimes, and which
also uses the death penalty. Although it can be clarifying to direct attention to the precise
difference in imposed cost represented by a life incarcerated and death, ultimately the
debate over the deterrence of the death penalty is bound up with the question of the
deterrent effect (on potential murderers) of criminal penalties generally.
The primary legal method of distinguishing murderers who receive the death
penalty from those who do not is a state-by-state system of aggravating and mitigating
factors that has been created and regulated by the United States Supreme Court, based on
their understanding that the Constitution requires certain special adjudicative procedures
in a capital case. 89 This “system” is not generally thought to be based upon any single
theoretical basis, such as a rational program of criminal deterrence.90 Indeed, a deterrence

89

See LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW, Ch. 13
(2004). Discussing this fascinatingly intricate body of jurisprudence, derived primarily from a five word
restriction against “cruel and unusual punishments inflicted[,]”is beyond the scope of what can be
encompassed by the present analysis.
90
See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 342-352 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ridiculing “death-isdifferent jurisprudence” as consisting of, inter alia, “lip service to precedents,” “empty talk,” and a “grab
bag of reasons” put forth in support of the case-specific “feelings and intuitions of a majority of the
Justices” regarding decency, penology and mercy, and any attention they give to considerations of
incapacitation, deterrence or retribution “does not bear analysis”) (emphasis in original).
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rationale is sometimes specifically disclaimed. 91 Nevertheless, taking the current system
of regulation as a constraint, these aggravating and mitigating factors, or the definition of
capital murder, are susceptible to rational reform in light of the foregoing model, in that
they can be shaped to become informational tools to distinguish the relative costliness of
prison to certain offenders, and through the logic of marginal deterrence, focus the death
penalty on the subcategory of persons on whom it has the greatest effect.
To generalize, a more rational system of selecting persons for capital punishment,
from the set of all murderers, would base this decision on empirical studies of those who
are most likely to be unfazed by imprisonment. Each capital sentencing “factor” would
be considered a point of similarity with the “target group” for the death penalty, or
alternatively, a piece of information that shifts the sentencing authorities estimate of
marginal deterrent effect a death sentence would have on potential offenders like the one
under consideration. This estimate, and the ultimate decision of whether to apply the
death penalty, would be guided by defining aggravating factors as those increasing the
probability of being over some threshold of undeterrability for which first-degree
murderers are to be executed, while each mitigating factor would be defined as a datum
decreasing this probability. 92

91

See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614-615 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) ( “Studies of deterrence are, at
most, inconclusive”) (citing to one study of capital punishment’s effect in one state, one “special report” by
the NEW YORK TIMES, and one survey soliciting the “expert views” on the topic of seventy past and current
presidents of two criminological associations and the Law and Society Association)
92
This system is probably most applicable in a procedural context like that of Florida. In Florida, all first
degree murder is, by definition, a capital crime, but unless a sentencing hearing is held, life imprisonment is
imposed as an alternative punishment. The jury hears evidence on aggravation and mitigation and makes a
recommendation regarding the applicability of the death penalty. However, the trial judge can ignore this
recommendation. The positive and negative factors are “weighed” by both the judge and jury. See
Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 713-714 (Fla. 2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) (describing
and criticizing system). Florida’s process seems one where it would be possible for a judge to engage in
the process of rationally updating of beliefs based on evidence relevant to the estimate; I have in mind a
novel application of Bayes’s Theorem in the sentencing context. For a description of this rule, and other
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Actual deterrence, of course, requires such potential killers to know that they are
under enhanced risk of death. For some possible factors implied by the current model,
this would be relatively easy, since prior prison experience would likely harden someone
against future imprisonment and shift them towards the target group of a rationally
applied death penalty. 93 At the same time, however, extended prison time (say, for a
violent felony) offers plenty of time and opportunity for the criminal justice system to
educate the offender that should he kill upon his release, the death sentence is waiting.
Aggravating factors or capital murder specifications 94 often include elements such
as participation in organized crime, 95 gang membership, 96 directing, hiring, or
compelling others to kill, 97 or killing as part of the drug trade. 98 All of these could be
interpreted to reflect the likelihood the individual involved is, or has the potential to be,
part of a continuing criminal network with operations inside and outside a prison.
Therefore, it is more likely the convict will have continued economic capacity as well as

applications, see Stephen E. Fienberg & Mark J. Schervish, Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the
Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking, 66 B.U. L. REV. 771, 774 (1986).
93
See CARTER & KREITZBERG, supra note 89, at 117 n.2 (reporting that 32 of 38 death penalty states make
prior convictions an aggravating circumstance). Most of these involve a requirement of violent felony,
however. Although this makes some sense, given that these individuals will more likely face a decision
whether or not to murder in the future, any felony giving a long sentence could adapt the felon to make him
resistant to the sanction of further incarceration. But see James Robertson, Closing the Circle: When Prior
Imprisonment Ought to Mitigate Capital Murder, 11-WTR KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 415, 419 (2002)
(arguing that prison harms inmates psychologically and makes them less culpable for post release crimes).
Comparison of the present analysis and Robertson’s, which reach opposite conclusions, is a good example
of the distinction between consequentialist and desert approaches to capital sentencing.
94
Alternatively, certain kinds of murders may be defined as including special circumstances. For purposes
of the current analysis, the two are not distinguished.
95
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848.
96
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 2004) (making potentially capital “murder carried
out to further the activities of a criminal street gang”)
97
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A), creating a possible death sentence for someone who “intentionally …
counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of an individual and such killing
results….”
98
See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(9) (Michie 2004) (making potentially capital “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing of any person in the commission of or attempted commission of a violation
…involving a Schedule I or II controlled substance, when such killing is for the purpose of furthering the
commission or attempted commission of such violation.”)
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some preferred status during incarceration.

99

Although it may be factually true that these

features were attached to an increased penalty because the underlying activity (organized
crime, drugs, etc.) was thought especially socially harmful in itself and therefore killings
attached to it are especially “heinous,” these bases can be justified in light of a deterrence
rationale.
This is not true of factors like the killing of children or the killing of pregnant
women, 100 or more generally, murders “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,” 101 which
are also considered “deserving” of the death penalty. Of course, even from a deterrence
perspective taken here, assigning the death penalty to heinous killings may well serve the
public good. First, we must not lose sight of the most basic conclusion that the great
majority of all murderers fear death and at least plausibly are deterred by it; therefore
providing for potential capital punishment of all first-degree murder (essentially true
already in several states) might be justified. Second, people who commit heinous crimes
could be particularly dangerous; this is an almost definitional point, since the types of
killings they commit are designated by society as especially harmful. Given plea
bargaining, putting them under fear of a death sentence makes it generally more likely
that a life sentence or long term of years can be obtained with certainty, and thereby
serves an important incapacitation function.

99

See, e.g., United States v. Shryock, 342 F. 3d 948, 961 (9th Cir. 2003) (describing one hybrid prison street
gang, the “Mexican Mafia”) (“By using violence, the Mexican Mafia eventually gained significant power
and control over illegal activities in the California prison system. As members were released from state
custody, they extended their influence outside the prison system to control drug distribution – principally
by ‘taxing’ drug dealers – in parts of Southern California.”) The rest of this extended case describes
several lethal operations of this group, and also describes specific instances where members received
narcotics in jail, sold them, and collected money for the account of their supplier. See id. at 969.
100
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(11)-(12) (Michie 2004)
101
CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) (West Supp. 2004)
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Realistically, however, the amount of time and money a particular state will
allocate to pursue the death penalty will not be limitless, and therefore it is advisable if
these resources are directed where they can achieve the greatest deterrent effect. As
discussed in Part II, this is partly a product of the process of plea bargaining, and there is
the potential for a critique here of current prosecutorial practice. Individuals with the
potentially for a relatively “easy” time in prison have every incentive to save their skins
to avoid the death penalty, and the most obvious such people are those with command
authority over other criminals inside and outside of prison, like organized crime bosses or
gang leaders. 102 Probably, and understandably, many prosecutors find appealing the
prospect of getting prominent public enemies “off the street” with certainty and without
an expensive trial.
However, the above analysis suggests there are serious dangers to giving in to this
temptation, particularly since these are the types of killers who are most likely to
deliberate and be knowledgeable about the personal risks and rewards of killing.

A

targeted message to criminal “kingpins” – that they will be selected for capital sentencing
if a death can be attributed to them – is not likely to stop their activities, of course, but it
could make them more cautious, killing fewer people or taking costly precautionary
measures. 103

Moreover, unlike the murderer who is faced only once with a decision

102

A well documented example is provided by Jeff Fort, the head of the Chicago street gang once known as
the Blackstone Rangers, and later as the El Rukns (with Fort taking the title of “Imam”). Although Fort
was put in federal prison for long sentence, “[d]espite this incarceration, Fort remained the leader and
mastermind of the El Rukns.” United States v. McAnderson, 914 F.2d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 1990) (describing
Fort’s planning from prison to have the gang hire itself out as a terrorist group to the Libyan government in
exchange for millions of dollars, planning murders to impress the Libyans, and acquiring light anti-tank
missiles for use on the South Side of Chicago).
103
This would have an additional salutary effect of decisively showing “crime does not pay” for prominent
killers whose criminal success prior to arrest encourages others within their communities and organizations
to engage in criminality and lethal violence. If someone like this continues to wield power and authority
from prison, this message is not sent. Assuming that a prominent crime figure is tied to murder, there is at
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about whether to kill, a kingpin will be faced with multiple lethal decisions, 104 and any
deterrent effect on such a person will be multiplied over the number of these decisions. If
there is indeed deterrence, these people will most likely and most often be the ones whose
behavior is influenced by it, and therefore, despite the increased cost of trying them even
in comparison with other capital defendants, if anybody should get a death sentence, it
should be these cold killers, who are notable for treating the lives of everyone else
according to the calculations of the personal utility, and against whom incarceration is an
empty threat.

least theoretical merit in the policy (and message) of “no deals” and seeking the death sentence where
possible. Cf. Blecker, Haven or Hell, supra note 64, at 1223: “A general deterrence advocate would urge
the D.C. police to concentrate on the ostentatious criminals – perverse role models who parade the streets
poisoning the minds of the kids. These criminals, who most undermine deterrence, would not be permitted
to hustle openly and flaunt their lifestyle.”
104
This trait is shared by serial killers, who also are a better target of death penalty prosecutions, and thus,
the use of aggravating factors, than are individuals who commit multiple murders at the same time (a very
common aggravating factor). As was illustrated with the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, this may not prevent
serial killers entirely, but it has a good chance to slow them down. This distinction points out a difference
between the present theory and the alternative view of marginal deterrence as described by Stigler. When
“marginal deterrence” is viewed as targeted toward the intensity of the criminal activity, we might imagine
that a rule of “life for one murder, death for two” would result in the criminal only killing one person when
they could have killed two. While this might happen occasionally, it seems somewhat unrealistic in most
murder contexts. For instance, if there are two witnesses and you kill one but not the other, you have saved
some expected cost, but you have gained nothing of value. For this to happen, both witnesses must die. So
we should not see much “Stigler deterrence” due to the death penalty. I hypothesize more lives are likely
to be saved by reducing those occasions when people do any killing, and those occasions when they know
there will be a risk they may have to kill in order to carry out the crime.
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